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Abstract: 
The Internet of Things (IoT) will connect a large number of communication and information 
systems. These systems will be part of everyday life in the same way mobile phones have become part 
of our lives. The information security properties of the IoT are often difficult to understand for its users, 
because they are hidden in pervasive systems and small devices manufactured by a large number of 
vendors. Trustworthiness, security functions and privacy implications are vast, and must be assessable 
to users and consumers. 
 
The main focus of the uTRUSTit project lies in its objective to integrate the user directly in the 
trust chain, guaranteeing transparency in the underlying security and reliability properties of the IoT. 
The results of uTRUSTit enable system manufacturers and system integrators to express the underlying 
security concepts to users in a comprehensible way, allowing them to make valid judgments on the 
trustworthiness of such systems. Further, uTRUSTit’s design guidelines on trust help the industry to 
implement the trust-feedback toolkit developed by uTRUSTit in a secure, usable and accessible way. 
 
This report will further develop the general legal requirements conceived under Deliverable 7.1 
(Legal Requirements for Trust in the IoT) and apply them to the Office and Home Scenario, as 
developed under Deliverable 2.2 (Definition of User Scenarios). Also the needs of the personas, as 
developed under Deliverable 2.1 (Personas) will be analyzed from a legal point of view. From this 
analysis, legal requirements will be developed to ensure that the prototypes that will be built to 
implement the solutions developed in the scenarios are fully legally compliant. Amongst others, it will 
be indicated whether the information that is shared in the chain of devices should be considered as 
personal data that is subject to the relevant privacy and data protection legislation, and the legal 
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1.   Introduction 
1.1 Background 
The work under Work Package 7 establishes a set of clear legal requirements for trust in the IoT 
and takes into consideration all relevant legislation, amongst which legislation relating to privacy and 
the protection of personal data. It comprises the legal evaluation of the prototypes envisioned in the 
scenarios in order to ensure legal compliance. Furthermore, this work package is to prove whether 
uTRUSTit's activities and in particular its results are in accordance with Europe's ethical values and 
standards. The ethical aspect of this work package was finalized under Deliverable 7.4 (Ethics Manual).  
1.2 Scope of this Deliverable 
This report will present the final results of the research performed in task 7.2 (Legal 
Requirements for the Office and the Home Scenario). It will further develop the general data protection 
requirements conceived under Deliverable 7.1 (Legal Requirements for Trust in the IoT), with specific 
attention for application of these requirements to the Office and Home Scenario, as developed under 
Deliverable 2.2 (Definition of User Scenarios). As the Office and Home Scenario were developed keeping 
in mind the Personas developed under Deliverable 2.1 (Personas), this report will analyze the personas 
and their specific needs from a legal point of view.  
 
This document will therefore specifically look at the legal requirements for the Smart Home and 
the Smart Office scenario and how the user can trust the devices. Regarding these scenarios, the 
general legal privacy policy framework stipulating legal requirements formulated in Task 7.1 will be 
applied so that the prototype can be designed with a clear set of legal requirements in mind. This report 
will, amongst others, analyze and determine whether information shared in the chain of devices is 
personal data that is subject to the relevant privacy and data protection legislation. 
 
 This report will furthermore investigate what information, if any, may be shared on online 
communities and ascertaining in what circumstances the consent of the user is required. Due attention 
will be given to processing of what may be considered potentially sensitive data such as information 
relating to the health of the user and which information may be processed by devices in the network of 
IoT in a smart home scenario. 
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2. Legal Analysis of Personas 
The uTRUSTit project aims to create guidelines, systems and interfaces that allow anyone, 
regardless of their ability, to determine the level of security and their own trust in the devices around 
them [UTRUSTIT 2011a]. In order to develop usable scenarios and technology, extensive testing by a 
representative user base is imperative. However, compiling and having continuous access to such user 
base is rather costly and time-consuming. As a result, developers often focus on the idea of the generic 
user, exposing the project to the risk of failing to take into account the specific needs of particular 
persons from different demographic backgrounds. Therefore, it was decided that the uTRUSTit project 
would make use of personas, hypothetical archetypical users from different demographic backgrounds 
that have clearly defined goals and needs.  
 
The personas to be used as targeted users in the uTRUSTit project were first developed at the 
Personas Workshop, held in Budapest on 1 December 2010 [UTRUSTIT 2010]. The definitive 
incarnations of the personas were further developed under Deliverable 2.1 – Personas [UTRUSTIT 
2011a]. By including personas with certain disabilities – such as dyslexia and vision impairment – it is 
ensured that these demographics are represented and taken into account in the development of the 
uTRUSTit solutions.  
 
The development of the specific goals and needs of the personas, as well as of their demographic 
background, does not provide insights that are only useful for the technical developments within the 
project. It can also serve as a starting point for the development of the legal requirements to which the 
final prototype will need to respond. With the personas in mind, these legal requirements can be 
developed early on in the project, to ensure that they are already taken into account during the 
technical development process. Such will avoid legal incompliance and potential major revisions in the 
later stages of the project.  
 
Therefore, the personas will be analyzed in order to extract the legal implications from their 
specific situations, goals and needs. Such legal implications will later on in the present deliverable form 
the basis for the development of the legal requirements.  
2.1 Anna Janssen 
As part of her job as a help desk assistant in an online shop, Anna will process all kinds of data, 
some of which – such as names, addresses and payment details – are to be considered as personal data 
in the sense of the European legal framework on data protection. Therefore, it is important to 
determine the capacity in which she performs such personal data processing. As she processes this data 
in the execution of her obligations under her agreement of employment with her employer, it will be 
the employer that acts as the data controller of such processing. As she is a direct employee of her 
employer, and not an external party contracted for this processing, she will not be considered as a 
processor. As a result, Anna will have to comply with the means and purposes on the processing of 
personal data determined by her employer. Here, one will have to assess how the assistive technologies 
used by Anna fit into the requirements set to the processing of personal data. For instance, does the 
screen reader log the data it reads to Anna? If so, it will be important to know how such logs are stored 
and who can access them.  
 
Anna’s wishes to be reminded when certain items run out of stock, to be able to look for items 
she misplaced and to manage all connected objects in her household would require the possibility to 
track such items and objects. While existing technologies – such as Radio-Frequency Identification 
(RFID) – already allow for such application, these technologies are often subject to a number of legal 
concerns. The development of specific requirements to which the use of such technologies in this 
context needs to respond is therefore imperative.  
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Last, some of Anna’s wishes would imply the processing of personal data, be it for personal and 
household use. Examples here are her wishes for an online Laundromat booking application, to 
coordinate all of her family’s appointments and to monitor her daughter’s online activities. While 
further analysis could indicate that such personal data processing would fall under the household 
exception as analyzed under Chapter 4.2.3 Application of the household exception of Deliverable 7.1 
Legal Requirements for Trust in the IoT [UTRUSTIT 2011b], one should still refer to the general 
provisions regarding privacy, as found in article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), 
amongst others.1  
2.2 David Clasen 
David’s stance on manuals as being only understandable by experts may also reflect his position 
with regards to consent forms. As analyzed under Chapter 4.2.6 How to obtain the data subject’s 
consent? of Deliverable 7.1 Legal Requirements for Trust in the IoT [UTRUSTIT 2011b], a consent form 
needs to contain rather elaborate information regarding the precise workings of the processing of 
personal data, its means and purposes, its actors and their specific roles, etc. in order to provide the 
data subject with the information he needs to provide his fully informed consent. However, as such 
elaborate consent forms more often than not result in an almost unintelligible text, they are not always 
fully read by data subjects. David’s stance on manuals could be an indication that David is one of the 
many people that, for instance, just click the “click-to-accept”-button on a website, resulting in the 
provision of consent without understanding to what they consented. For David, one could therefore 
refer to the layered consent form as analyzed under Deliverable 7.1. User-friendliness, both with 
regards to technical manuals and documents with legal consequences such as consent forms, should 
prevail in order to make technology more accessible and trustworthy towards people with an attitude 
of general mistrust in technology that they do not understand.  
 
David’s more successful encounter with technology comes in the form of a health monitoring 
system set up in the home of his father, Paul. Apart from monitoring Paul’s general condition, this 
system also includes a warning function in case of emergency – for instance when Paul falls – and a 
function to monitor Paul’s medical cabinet. The system also allows David to remotely grant access rights 
to Paul’s home, in case a healthcare organization needs to make an unscheduled emergency visit. While 
such system certainly aids in the caretaking of the elderly that want to retain certain independence, it 
also raises a number of legal questions. For one, as Paul is the one who is being monitored, he will have 
to provide his consent in all of this. With the elderly, this raises the additional question regarding their 
capacity to provide consent and who could possibly grant such consent on their behalf. Second, one will 
need to assess how intrusive such system can be. Should it be allowed to monitor continuously, or 
should there be an option for the person being monitored to shut down the system when he wants to? 
Last, it should be noted that this system processes data regarding the medical condition of a natural 
person, which falls under the scope of sensitive data according to the European legal framework on 
data protection. One will therefore have to establish a clear list of requirements to which the working 
of such health monitoring system should respond.  
 
While online shops are playing an ever-growing role in the world’s economy, there are still many 
people that – like David – do not trust the online payments associated with such transactions. One of 
his fears is whether his credit card data is handled securely. While this raises mostly technical questions, 
it also has a few legal aspects, for instance relating to technologies of which the use is already 
embedded in law, such as the electronic signature. Further trust in online payments could be generated 
by ensuring that all statements received in the process – be it in the form of actual electronic 
documents, such as an electronic invoice, or in the form of simple user interface feedback – are true 
and reliable. Here, one could refer to the legal value of electronic information, whereby the value and 
                                                          
1
 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms signed at Rome, 4 November 1950.    
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general trustworthiness of such electronic information could be established by ensuring the 
authenticity and integrity of such information.  
2.3 Paul Clasen 
Paul has already been referred to in the analysis of his son, David Clasen. Paul is the subject of 
the health monitoring system set up by his son and also accessible to a private healthcare organization 
that makes regular visits and can also intervene in case of emergency.  
 
The main legal issue that can be derived from Paul’s situation refers to his consent. He is the 
subject of a health monitoring system – which also allows his son to remotely grant access rights to the 
house – his grandson has remote access to his computer, his mobile phone is essentially used to track 
his whereabouts, etc. While he appreciates certain aspects of this elaborate system, such as the 
reminders, his unfamiliarity with modern technology makes it difficult for him to accept this system. He 
has also indicated that he finds certain elements too intrusive and asked his grandson to help him 
disable these elements. However, he has to tolerate this system as it allows him to maintain certain 
independence and to keep living in his own home. Without such system, he would have to move in with 
his family or possibly even relocate to a more suited facility such as a retirement home.  
 
The tradeoff between retaining certain independence while under surveillance or losing all 
independence raises the question as to whether this can still be considered as being consent given out 
of the data subject’s own free will, as required under existing data protection legislation. As already 
hinted at, one may also wonder whether Paul – given his early-stage dementia – is still legally capable 
of providing his own consent. Additionally, one should also assess in how far Paul retains certain control 
over the processing of his personal data through the use of such system. Can he opt-out of certain 
features he finds too intrusive? Therefore, legal requirements will have to be drafted to ensure that 
legally valid consent can be provided in the use of such health monitoring system. These requirements 
also need to keep in mind the possibility of the further deterioration of Paul’s state of mind, which 
could make future revocation or modification of his consent – given when he was still capable thereto – 
impossible.  
2.4 Fredrik Clasen 
While David Clasen is a clear example of a person with a general mistrust against modern 
technology, his son, Fredrik, serves as an example of somebody who might confer too much trust onto 
technology. Surprisingly, the legal implications are rather similar: as Fredrik, like his father, never reads 
manuals and legal documents such as privacy policies, he is exposed to the risk of granting his consent 
without fully knowing to which he consented. This overconfidence is also reflected in his stance on 
passwords and security. Therefore, one could look into how technology can be used to ensure that the 
data subject actually read and understood the consent form before providing his consent. As forcing a 
user to read through such often unintelligible text would have a negative impact on his user experience, 
one will have to keep user-friendliness in mind here as well, especially with regards to Fredrik’s dyslexia 
and his use of assistive technologies.  
 
In general, his lack of care for security with regards to his personal data and his online 
transactions expose Fredrik to a number of other risks as well. With recent waves of data theft, hacking 
and other types of cybercrime, the importance of IT security is stressed once more.2 Adequate security 
is already required by data protection legislation. Current developments indicate that a notification 
duty in case of data theft may be adopted in the near future. One will therefore have to analyze the 
                                                          
2
 Note, for instance, the numerous high-profile cases of data theft – notably including personal data of users of 
the Sony Playstation Network – by collective LulzSec in June 2011, itpro.co.uk/634393/timeline-lulzsec-hack-
attacks. 
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current legal provisions – and possible future developments – with regards to data and IT security in 
order to establish the legal requirements hereof. As with consent, user-friendliness should be kept in 
mind.  
 
Fredrik’s experiments with technology could have implications regarding the warranty on these 
devices. Any use that does not conform with the use intended by the manufacturer of a product could 
result in voiding the product’s warranty. Furthermore, under the European legal framework on product 
liability, such unintended use could lead to shared liability between the product’s manufacturer and the 
user. As a result of such shared liability, the user will not receive full compensation for the damages 
caused to him by the faulty product, which he would have received if he had used the product as 
intended by its manufacturer.  
 
Fredrik’s wish to share media data with his friends may raise questions with regards to copyright 
legislation. If they share copyrighted data, they will have to ensure that such sharing falls under the 
scope of fair use. Legal requirements are therefore needed to ensure that such media sharing system 
limits its functionality to what is permitted under copyright law, for instance by limiting access to the 
media data to properly licensed users. As will be explained further on – in chapter 4.7.2 - Producer’s 
liability for copyright infringements – it will also be important to establish what the media sharing 
system or application was intended for by its producers.  
2.5 Sara Moser 
Sara’s wishes are mainly aimed at accessibility. She wants to be able to remotely provide access 
rights to her apartment and to be able to access her personal files from wherever she goes. Using 
collaborative tools, remote and wireless connections, location based services and cloud computing 
applications, security is of utmost importance to her. This accessibility also has to be dynamic. She 
wants to change the access rights to her apartment when necessary, to provide meeting partners 
temporary and limited access to certain data and to control the information that is accessible about 
her.  
 
As with Fredrik, one will have to assess the current legal provisions with regards to data and IT 
security in order to establish the legal requirements with which such systems need to comply.  
2.6 Summary  
While the personas show very different goals and needs and are of different demographic 
backgrounds, there are a number of recurring themes when analyzing their goals and needs from a 
legal point of view.  
 
First, the data protection requirements developed under D7.1 Legal Requirements for Trust in 
the IoT will have to be applied to the specific situations of the personas. For instance, it will have to be 
analyzed what the influence is of the use of assistive technologies in processing personal data as part of 
one’s job.  
 
Privacy related requirements should not only be aimed at professional processing of personal 
data. For instance, if one wants to keep track of one’s family’s appointments or Internet behavior. 
While such would occur in a household setting – thus possibly benefiting from an exception to the 
general obligations under European data protection legislation – one should still bear in mind general 
privacy provisions.  
 
Further with regards to data protection and privacy, there are a few issues regarding consent. 
First, it is clear that certain data subjects do not fully read consent forms and privacy policies – be it due 
to mistrust of technology or out of overconfidence in technology – and are thus exposed to the risk of 
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providing consent without knowing to which they consented. While consent forms should provide 
complete information, they should also keep user-friendliness in mind. Furthermore, guarantees are 
needed towards their effectiveness. Another consent issue concerns elderly persons who are subjected 
to a health monitoring system in order to maintain a certain level of independence. Can such trade-off 
still be considered as freely given consent and are elderly persons with onsets of dementia still capable 
of providing consent?  
 
The health monitoring system also raises questions with regards to its functionalities and its 
adaptability to the specific needs of users. For instance, can a location-tracking component be disabled 
when not needed? Also, as health data is processed in using such health monitoring system, one will 
have to keep in mind the requirements on processing this type of sensitive data set by the European 
legal framework on data protection.  
 
Next, in order to generate more trust in online payment transactions, one will have to analyze 
the requirements set by specific legislation relating to transactions, such as legislation concerning e-
commerce. In order to ensure that electronic information is truthful and trustworthy, one can also 
establish its authenticity and integrity, relating to the legal value of said information.  
 
Another general issue concerns security and access management. Regardless of whether a 
certain individual cares for security or not, adequate security features are imperative for any 
trustworthy product when dealing with the number of interconnections and subsequent security risks 
posed by the IoT. Also from a legal point of view, security has become the subject of specific legal 
provisions, for instance with regards to the storage of personal data. Specific requirements looking at 
security from a legal perspective are therefore needed.  
 
Last, one should look at the specific technologies used to implement certain of the features 
desired by the personas, such as the object tracking system that could potentially be realized using 
technologies such as RFID. This warrants specific legal requirements relating to the use of such 
technologies for the purposes envisioned here.   
 
While most of the previous is aimed at formulating legal requirements with which the solutions 
offered to the personas will have to comply, one should also keep their intended use by the personas 
themselves in mind. For instance, if the intended use of a media center constitutes a breach of what 
can be considered as fair use under copyright law, one should ensure that such media center is 
designed to promote only legitimate use.  
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3. Legal Analysis of Scenarios 
The technology to be developed within the uTRUSTit project will be demonstrated in three 
different settings. These settings are developed within three scenarios: the Smart Home, the Smart 
Office and the E-Voting scenario [UTRUSTIT 2011c]. Under the scope of this deliverable, the Smart 
Home and Smart Office scenario will be analyzed.  
 
The scenarios are designed to reflect challenges for building trust with the connected elements in 
the IoT. Using the personas developed for use within the project, the scenarios were designed to 
provide solutions to the specific goals and needs of these personas. This makes the scenarios more 
realistic and relatable. These scenarios are presented as technology-neutral. Specific requirements for 
technologies to be used will be defined in a separate deliverable, D2.4 Technical Requirements for the 
IoT Prototype.  
 
As with the personas, the scenarios will be analyzed from a legal point of view in order to extract 
the legal implications of the solutions envisioned within the uTRUSTit project. Such legal implications 
will later be developed into legal requirements to which the prototype will need to respond.  
3.1 Smart Home Scenario 
Smart home technology is a collective term for information- and communication technology (ICT) 
as used in houses, where the various components are communicating via a local network [UTRUSTIT 
2011c]. The Smart Home scenario has been divided into three applications: Trusted Smart Home 
Services, Trusted Smart Home Entertainment Management and the Inventory of Things. 
 
The Trusted Home Scenario was developed around the needs of the Paul Clasen persona, who 
suffers from the onsets of dementia yet wants to retain independency while under surveillance by a 
health monitoring system. For instance, the scenario describes the remote access management system 
to Paul’s home and his medical cabinet. This enables his son to dynamically change access rights when 
needed. This corresponds to the legal implication of security and access management, as mentioned 
under chapter 2.6 summary of this deliverable.  
The Trusted Home application also provides for medicine management and control. Apart from 
controlling who can access this cabinet, the cabinet can also keep track of its contents. It can notify Paul 
when he needs to take a pill, which pill to take, and alert Paul’s attending physician to prescribe a refill. 
Such application would require the use of RFID technology and a secure Internet connection between 
the parties involved, which includes the attending physician, the pharmacist and a healthcare worker. 
Therefore, the legal implications of the use of these technologies for the purposes intended here will 
have to be analyzed. Also, as this medicine management system includes the processing of health data, 
one will have to bear in mind the requirements set to the processing of this type of sensitive personal 
data. For instance, it needs to be assessed whether the cabinet keeps track of all medication and how 
such tracking logs are protected. Furthermore, it will need to be clear who has access to such data and 
how such data is stored.  
This application also includes the use of location tracking services, embedded within Paul’s 
mobile phone or his uTRUSTit device. Such would allow his son – or in case of emergency also 
healthcare workers – to track Paul’s movements. This raises a number of legal questions. For one, the 
continuous tracking of a person’s whereabouts is rather invasive to the privacy of that person.3 
Adequate consent will therefore have to be provided. Sufficient access rights need to ensure that only 
authorized persons have access to this tracking ability and the data it collects and stores. Also, one will 
                                                          
3
 Note, for instance, the case in which the popular iPhone was found to store a file keeping track of every 
movement of its user, even if such user thought he had disabled all functions regarding geolocalization data 
[ALLEN 2011]. 
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have to assess what degree of user control is needed. Should Paul be able to disable the tracking option 
when he wants to? Last, as with RFID, the use of Global Positioning System (GPS) technologies calls for 
legal requirements to which the use of such technologies in this context should respond.  
 
The Trusted Smart Home Entertainment Management application allows visitors to bring their 
own music to play on the Clasen family’s home media center. This media center manages all types of 
media owned by the family and provides for wireless streaming in all rooms. For visitors, adequate 
access rights management and security will be required to provide access to play music, yet while 
shielding of personal media, such as family photos. Apart from Wi-Fi and RFID, this system could also 
make use of Bluetooth and Near Field Communication (NFC), corresponding to the need for 
requirements for the use of such technologies in this context, as explained before. The media center 
also has an Internet connection, enabling the purchase of music online and the direct upload of this 
music to the media center. Such online transactions were also discussed under the analysis of the 
personas. The Smart Home Entertainment Management application also raises questions with regards 
to the compliance with copyright protection. For instance, if a visitor brings his own music to the Clasen 
family’s home media center and if that music is uploaded to that media center, then a copy of the music 
has effectively been made. Therefore, it needs to be analyzed in how far such would correspond with 
fair use and how copyright infringements can be avoided.   
 
Last, the Inventory of Things allows for one to maintain an overview on other devices in the IoT 
and to control what information these devices request and what is effectively transmitted. In practice, 
this application scans whether data is being transmitted, possibly unbeknownst to the user. The user 
can subsequently disable the transmissions of data that he did not approve. While this provides the 
user with a certain degree of control over what of his data – potentially personal data – is being 
transmitted, it also raises the question on whether the user should not be asked to opt-in to such 
information transmission instead of having to opt-out from it.  
3.2 Smart Office Scenario 
While the actual applications of the Smart Office and the Smart Home are rather similar, they 
stem from different goals and could therefore have different technical and legal implications. As a 
result, the Smart Office scenario was developed separately from the Smart Home scenario.  
 
First, the project meeting application describes the need for security and access management. 
Employees and visitors must be granted appropriate credentials, links to infrastructure, vouchers, 
access to certain facilities and this sometimes for specific periods of time. The access management and 
technologies used – such as Bluetooth and NFC – raise similar questions as under the Smart Home 
scenario. Additional questions are raised with regards to the invitations and credentials. One will need 
to establish their authenticity and integrity to assess their value and origins. This relates to the 
implication of the legal value of electronic information, as discussed earlier. Also connections to the 
meeting infrastructure – such as projectors and printers – and taking secure notes relate to access 
management. However, as all this access management could lead to a great number of recordings – for 
instance when somebody enters through a door – one needs to ensure that the legal provisions 
regarding privacy and data protection on the work floor are respected.  
With regards to meeting partners, the data subject should be given the competence to – up to a 
certain level – decide which of his personal data he wants to share. Such correspond to the legal 
requirements with relation to data protection as discussed under D7.1 Legal Requirements for Trust in 
the IoT. Also here, technologies such as Bluetooth and NFC are used to establish device communication.  
While the possibility for remote meeting participation in part also relies on access rights, there is 
an important deviation. The scenario provides for digital resources sharing, in which the original request 
for data sharing included a back-up service. Important is that the user can change this request at will, 
leaving out the option of backing-up personal data on a remote server, before accepting. Such would 
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provide the user with an important competence not to be confronted with nonnegotiable requests that 
require sharing of data that the user does not want to share.  
 
A second scenario, the Smart Break Room, allows for employers to securely purchase snacks and 
beverages. Using NFC, the uTRUSTit device could communicate an employer’s choice of beverage to the 
vending machine and subsequently pay for the purchase. Again, the technologies used and the use of 
electronic payment will have to be further analyzed from a legal point of view.  
3.3 Summary 
Given the many similarities between the goals and needs of the personas developed within this 
project and the scenarios subsequently developed to visualize a solution to these goals and needs, the 
legal implications that were extracted from the scenarios correspond fully to the legal implications 
extracted from the analysis of the personal performed earlier under chapter 2 of this deliverable.  
 
In short, the legal implications stemming from the scenarios can be divided into a number of 
categories. First, the implications regarding data protection relate to how personal data is processed 
and to how privacy is respected, both at work and at home. These implications were found in both the 
Smart Home and the Smart Office scenarios.  
Second, a number of elements – mainly the use of the Trusted Smart Home health monitor – 
raise questions with regards to consent. How can informed consent be effectively given here and are 
certain persons still legally capable of providing their consent?  
Third, the health monitor raises further concerns with regards to the adaptability of its features 
to the user’s wishes and with regards to its processing of health data. 
Fourth, both the Home Entertainment Management application and the Smart Break Room make 
use of online payments. Here, one will have to ensure that such payments are trustworthy executed. 
Existing provisions relating to, for instance, e-commerce and the legal value of electronic information 
could aid in securing the trustworthiness of online transactions.  
Fifth, security and access management is one of the most important features of both the Smart 
Home and the Smart Office scenario. Also here, one will need to assess how such access management 
can be performed fully legally compliant.  
Sixth, one will have to set the requirements to the technology that will be used in realizing the 
applications envisioned here. These technologies include RFID, GPS, NFC, Bluetooth and Wi-Fi.  
Last, the borders between providing access to a home media center and illegitimate file sharing 
have to be guarded in order to provide the uTRUSTit applications from being used as a potential 
copyright infringement.  
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4. Development of Legal Requirements 
In the analysis of the personas developed within this research project and of the visualization of 
their needs and goals in the home and office scenarios, a number of legal implications were derived 
from this information. These legal implications will be further analyzed in order to be developed into 
legal requirements to which the prototype of the Smart Home and Smart Office scenario will have to 
adhere, in order to ensure their legal compliance.  
 
The basic legal requirements formulated in Deliverable 7.1 – Legal Requirements for Trust in the 
IoT – will be further developed here with specific attention to the precise legal implications set by the 
personas and the scenarios analyzed. For the purposes of maintaining an easy overview for non-legal 
specialists, the general and more specific legal requirements developed here will be consolidated under 
chapter 5 – Consolidation of Legal Requirements – of the present deliverable.  
4.1 General data protection requirements 
Analysis of the personas and the scenarios demonstrated a number of legal implications with 
regards to data protection. While the general European legal framework regarding the processing of 
personal data was already covered under the previous legal deliverable – D7.1 Legal Requirements for 
Trust in the IoT – the basic legal requirements developed there will have to be applied to the specific 
situations in terms of needs and goals of the personas and the visualization of potential solutions in the 
scenarios. For instance, it will have to be analyzed what the influence is of the use of assistive 
technologies in processing personal data as part of one’s job.  
 
An important thing to note here is that privacy related requirements should not only be aimed at 
professional processing of personal data. For instance, if one wants to keep track of one’s family’s 
appointments or Internet behavior, one could also be processing personal data. While such would occur 
in a household setting – thus possibly benefiting from an exception to the general obligations under 
European data protection legislation – one should still bear in mind general privacy provisions.  
4.1.1 Data protection and privacy at home 
A number of elements expressed in the needs and goals of several personas and in the Smart 
Home scenario indicated legal implications with regards to the protection of the privacy of people at 
home, as well as possible processing of the personal data of these people in a private setting. For 
instance, the Trusted Smart Home provides for access management, which can include the logging of 
the access habits of the people living in that home. Also the request for a tool to manage all 
appointments of different family members may be considered to be intrusive to the personal sphere of 
certain of these family members. This is even more the case for the expressed desire to monitor the 
online activities of one’s children. One will therefore have to analyze how such practices would have to 
comply with existing legal provisions regarding privacy and data protection at home.  
 
As already analyzed under D7.1 - Legal Requirements for Trust in the IoT, article 3 (2) of the Data 
Protection Directive4 provides for an exception that states that the directive does not apply to the 
processing of personal data  
by a natural person in the context of a purely personal or household 
activity.  
                                                          
4
 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of 
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data , OJ L 281 of 23 
November 1995, 31-50 (hereinafter: Data Protection Directive).  
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This exception is commonly referred to as the ‘household exception’ and allows for natural 
persons to perform what can be regarded as a processing of personal data, as long as such processing 
serves strictly personal intent.  
 
For the application of the household exception, it is imperative that the person processing certain 
types of personal data acts in a personal capacity and that his processing serves only purposes of his 
personal or household sphere. One of the defining elements to establish personal capacity and personal 
sphere purposes was found in case law, where the ECJ ruled that the publicity of the information is a 
defining aspect of the household exception.5 If, for instance, the personal agenda of all family members 
is published on the Internet with no access restrictions, this data will be considered as having become 
publicly available. As a result, the household exception can no longer apply to the processing of this 
data.  
 
One can summarize this as follows: 
Req. B16: Processing of personal data of family members of the same 
household is required to be executed in a personal capacity and 
strictly for purposes in the personal or household sphere, with 
restricted publicity of this data. Failure to observe personal capacity, 
personal or household purposes or to keep data publicity limited will 
result in the non-applicability of the household exception. As a result, 
the processing of this personal data will have to comply fully with all 
personal data processing requirements. 
 
However, the previous only covers situations in which actual personal data is processed. Certain 
elements – such as the monitoring of a child’s online activities – do not necessarily require the 
processing of personal data, thus not necessitating the applicability of the household exception. 
However, they can pose a rather substantial intrusion of the personal sphere of the child. Also with 
regards to the logging of who accesses the home at what hour could pose an infringement to a person’s 
privacy, even if the personal data potentially processed in this act would be covered by the household 
exception. 
 
Such monitoring activities may even pose an infringement to criminal law. In Belgium, for 
instance, private telecommunication is protected by article 314bis of the Criminal Code. This article is 
aimed at everybody who willingly takes notice of the contents of a private telecommunication to which 
he is no party, during its transmission and without prior permission of all participants to the 
communication. Given the broad scope of this article, private telecommunication can also include 
communications through the Internet [DUMORTIER 2010]. However, note that for the scope of this 
article, it is important that the notice of the contents of the private telecommunication needs to be 
taken during its transmission. Looking into a child’s saved chat logs, for instance, will not be covered by 
the scope of this article.  
 
However, by taking notice of the contents of the private telecommunication, one obviously also 
takes notice of the existence of that private telecommunication, which is another criminal act according 
to article 124 of the Electronic Communications Act7. This article concerns the situation in which one 
deliberately takes notice of the existence of online communication to which this person is not a party 
and without having received prior permission from all participants to that communication. Such could 
include the monitoring of a child’s Internet activities by its parents without prior consent of the child 
                                                          
5
 ECJ C-101/2001 Bodil Lindqvist, 2003, §46-47; ECJ C‑73/07 Tietosuojavaltuutettu v Satakunnan Markkinapörssi 
Oy & Satamedia Oy, 2008, §44. 
6
 Note that the numbering of the requirements used throughout this document corresponds to the consolidated 
requirements found under chapter 5-Consolidation of Legal Requirements. 
7
 Act of 13 June 2005 regarding electronic communications, Belgian State Gazette 20 June 2005. 
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and its communication partners. As parents are in theory the legal guardians of their children until they 
reach the age of majority, such consent would in principle not be required. This is, however, a legal grey 
area in which one would have to assess the level of maturity and accountability of the minor. If, for 
instance, parents have entrusted their minor child with unrestricted Internet access, one could argue 
that the parents have conferred a certain level of responsibility unto it, which would in turn require the 
parents to receive prior permission before checking in on its online activities.   
 
Also general privacy law can oppose such monitoring of online activities, personal agendas and 
home access habits. For one, article 8 (1) of the European Convention on Human Rights8 specifically 
states that  
everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his 
home and his correspondence,  
which also applies to children9. Specifically for minors, there is the United Nations Convention on 
the Rights of the Child10, which states in its article 16 that  
no child shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his 
or her privacy, family, home or correspondence.  
Given the wide acceptance of this convention by UN Member States and their subsequent 
ratification of that instrument, one can expect to find similar provisions in national legislation 
worldwide.  
While it should be noted that human rights conventions are generally conceived as including 
vertical obligations – i.e. obligations of a State towards it citizens – there is already enough consensus 
on the possibility of horizontal obligations – thus between private citizens [BESELINK 2003; 
VANWIJNGAERDEN 2008]. Especially the European Convention on Human Rights has to be regarded as 
being an important instrument, given its importance in drafting the Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
the European Union.11 
 
As a result, the general right to privacy – even when no processing of personal data is involved – 
will protect the privacy of children and other family members. While children that have reached the 
national age of maturity are protected as any other adult, it is clear that also minors have their personal 
right to privacy. Consequently, every unwanted intrusion to the private life of family members of the 
same household – including with regards to their communications – will be a violation of their right to 
privacy. Therefore, the home access monitoring, agenda sharing and Internet activity monitoring can 
only be executed upon being granted prior consent of each individual concerned.  
Req. B2: Also when no personal data is processed or when the 
household exception applies, any intrusion to the personal sphere of 
family members – including minor children – will be considered as a 
violation of their privacy. Prior consent must therefore be granted.  
4.1.2 Data protection and privacy at the office 
As the Smart Office scenario presented IoT solutions that were rather similar to what was 
analyzed under the Smart Home scenario – access management and logging, collaborative technologies 
and activity monitoring – similar legal implications can be formulated as well. The main difference in an 
office environment is that the household exception regarding the processing of personal data for 
personal or household purposes cannot apply in such setting. As a result, all processing of personal data 
executed in an office environment will need to be fully compliant to the general rules on data 
protection.  
                                                          
8
 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms signed at Rome, 4 November 1950.  
9
 Specifically addressed by the European Commission: Commission Green Paper of 16 October 1996 on the 
protection of minors and human dignity in audiovisual and information services, COM(1996) 483, 12. 
10
 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, 20 November 1989, A/RES/44/25.  
11
 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, OJ C 83 of 30 March 2010, 389 et seq.   
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The general European framework on data protection was analyzed under D7.1 – Legal 
Requirements for Trust in the IoT. The general requirements developed there can be applied to this 
particular situation. The following list of requirements can therefore be re-used and will – later on in 
chapter 5 (Consolidation of Legal Requirements) of this deliverable – be expanded and further 
coordinated using the more specific requirements that will be developed here:  
Req. A1: It is required that IoT actors identified as data controllers 
should be aware of the precise definitions of national data protection 
legislation applicable to the processing under their control. 
Req.A2: The data subject’s free, informed and unambiguous consent 
is required for legitimate processing of personal data. 
Req. A3: Legality or transparency is required for fair and lawful 
processing of personal data. 
Req. A3: The purposes of the processing of personal data are required 
to be clearly indicated in advance. 
Req. A5: The processing of personal data is required to only include 
relevant and non-excessive data, in relation to the specified purposes. 
Req. A7: The data controller is required to ensure sufficient 
information of the data subject. 
Req. A8: The data controller is furthermore required to ensure that 
the data subject can fully enjoy his right of access, his right to 
correction and his right to object. 
Req. A9: Special notice is required to the special categories of 
personal data. 
Req. A10: The data controller is required to ensure confidentiality and 
security of the processing of personal data under his control. 
Req. A11: Due notification to the competent national Data Protection 
Authority (or Authorities), in compliance with national legislation, is 
required. 
Req. A12: Data transfers to third States are required to comply with 
applicable legislation. 
 
Similar to the analysis performed for the Smart Home scenario, one will also have to keep in 
mind general privacy provisions. Even though the Smart Office cannot be regarded as a personal or 
household setting – thus the non-applicability of the household exception with regards to personal data 
processing – it is generally accepted that employees have a certain right to privacy on their work floor. 
Also article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights is said to apply on the work floor, as found 
in case law by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR).12 
 
As the protection of private telecommunication13 – as found in the Belgian Criminal Code and the 
Belgian Act on Electronic Communications, as discussed under chapter 4.1.1 (Data protection and 
privacy at home) of the present deliverable – makes no direct exception to telecommunications on the 
work floor, one should consider this principle to apply to telecommunications on the work floor as well 
[DUMORTIER 2010]. However, as an agreement to employment implies a certain authority of the 
employer over its employees, he will be able to exercise some control over the telecommunications in 
                                                          
12
 ECHR 62617/00 Copland v the United Kingdom, 2007, §§ 41-42.  
13
 Also addressed as communication secrecy [WORKING PARTY 55]. 
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his business. As a result, the Belgian Labour Council adopted a collective labour agreement regulating 
the protection of the privacy of employees with regards to electronic communications.14  
The collective labour agreement holds that an employer can decide on which means for 
telecommunications can be used on his work floor, without hindering the employees’ right to private 
telecommunications. While the employer may set rules on the use and on the control of these means 
for telecommunications, he will have to ensure that such rules are sufficiently transparent and that they 
comply with the general principles regarding data protection, as monitoring such telecommunications 
may include the processing of personal data. Most importantly, the collective labour agreement holds 
that the monitoring of telecommunications can only occur for four specific purposes: (1) the prevention 
of unlawful or slanderous facts, that could damage the moral or dignity of another person; (2) the 
protection of economical and financial interests of the company; (3) the safety and good technical 
functioning of the network systems of the company, including the monitoring of its costs and the 
physical protection of installations and (4) the bona fide compliance with the rules and provisions 
regarding the use of online technologies as applicable in that company. In the first three cases, the 
employer can monitor the data of one specific employee. In the case of general monitoring (4), the 
employer must first warn the employee before he can monitor that specific employee [DUMORTIER 
2010].15  
 
While this collective labour agreement obviously only applies to Belgium, it should be noted that 
also the Article 29 Working Party has adopted a number of texts assessing the right to privacy on the 
work floor. One text in particular relates to the surveillance of electronic communications [WORKING 
PARTY 55]. In this document, the Working Party confirms that employees can have reasonable 
expectations of privacy on their work floor, which needs to be balanced with the employer’s interests 
regarding the running of his business and regarding liabilities. To that result, article 8 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights and Directive 95/46/EC are fully applicable to an office environment.  
With regards to e-mail monitoring, it is stated that such can only be done if such is absolutely 
necessary, which will only occur in rare cases [WORKING PARTY 55]. The principles of Directive 
95/46/EC regarding finality, transparency, legitimacy, proportionality and data subject’s rights are fully 
applicable. While monitoring of an employee’s e-mail account cannot be fully ruled out, the Working 
Party advises to maintain a policy in which employees can use private webmail accounts for their 
private communications, next to their professional e-mail account.  
For Internet monitoring, the Working Party advises prevention of Internet access misuse by 
technical means. Such would limit the need to actual monitoring of an employee’s Internet activities. 
For instance, by monitoring which websites are most visited by an office the employer can get an idea 
of potential Internet access abuse without having to monitor all employees’ traffic. An Internet Policy 
could lay down a number of ground rules and should be made fully transparent to the employees.  
While the general data protection provisions normally require the data subject’s prior and 
informed consent, the Working Party finds that such consent is of no value in an unequal relationship 
such as between an employer and his employees. Consent should therefore be reserved for cases in 
which the employee truly has the free choice to give his consent, as well as to withdraw that consent 
when he changes his mind. Free consent would also include the possibility to negotiate or to alter the 
situation to which one’s consent is needed. In the scenarios, for instance, this was expressed by the 
possibility to change a request for digital resources sharing [UTRUSTIT 2011c], for which the original 
request for data sharing included a back-up service. In the scenario, the request was changed at the will 
of the user, leaving out the option of backing-up personal data on a remote server, before accepting. 
Such provides the user with the competence to negotiate requests in order to provide his truly free 
consent.  
 
                                                          
14
 Collective Labour Agreement nr. 81 of 26 April 2002 regarding the protection of the privacy of employees with 
regards to the monitoring of electronic communications data, www.nar-cnt.be.  
15
 The idea of prior notice of monitoring activities can also be found in article 6.14 of the International Labour 
Office’s Code of Practice on the Protection of workers’ personal data [ILO 1997].  
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The Working Party has provided a list with a number of requirements for the processing of 
personal data of employees, which corresponds well with the requirements already listed here 
[WORKING PARTY 48]. In order to provide a more complete overview, the requirements formulated by 
the Working Party will be listed here as well:  
Req. A5: Data must be collected for a specified, explicit and legitimate 
purpose and not further processed in a way incompatible with those 
purposes. 
Req. C1: As a very minimum, workers need to know which data the 
employer is collecting about them (directly or from other sources), 
which are the purposes of processing operations envisaged or carried 
out with these data presently or in the future. Transparency is also 
assured by granting the data subject the right to access to his/her 
personal data and with the data controllers’ obligation of notifying 
supervisory authorities as provided in national law. 
Req. C2: The processing of workers' personal data must be legitimate. 
Article 7 of the Directive lists the criteria making the processing 
legitimate. 
Req. C3: The personal data must be adequate, relevant and not 
excessive in relation to the purposes for which they are collected 
and/or further processed. Assuming that workers have been informed 
about the processing operation and assuming that such processing 
activity is legitimate and proportionate, such a processing still needs 
to be fair with the worker. 
Req. C4: Employment records must be accurate and, where necessary, 
kept up to date. The employer must take every reasonable step to 
ensure that data inaccurate or incomplete, having regard to the 
purposes for which they were collected or further processed, are 
erased or rectified. 
Req. C5: The employer must implement appropriate technical and 
organisational measures at the workplace to guarantee that the 
personal data of his workers is kept secured. Particular protection 
should be granted as regards unauthorised disclosure or access. 
Req. C6: Staff in charge or with responsibilities in the processing of 
personal data of other workers need to know about data protection 
and receive proper training. Without an adequate training of the staff 
handling personal data, there could never be appropriate respect for 
the privacy of workers in the workplace. 
 
In summary, one will find that the processing of data regarding employees will inevitably include 
personal data, in which case such processing will need to comply with the general provisions regarding 
data protection. Personal data will also be processed when monitoring employees’ activities. 
Furthermore, the general right to privacy is regarded as also applying on the work floor, thus requiring a 
balance between the exercise of this right by the employee and the legitimate interests of the employer 
in efficiently running his business. Also the right to communication secrecy will need to be respected.  
 
There is, however, another aspect relating to the processing of personal data on the work floor. 
While the previous analysis only focuses on an employer’s processing of the personal data of his 
employees, the business activities of the employer may also require the processing of personal data, for 
instance of customers. As a result, such processing will also have to comply with the principles set forth 
by Directive 95/46/EC.  
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First, it is important to determine the capacity in which an employee performs personal data 
processing for his employer. In general, employees will perform such processing as part of the 
execution of their obligations under their agreement of employment with their employers. 
Subsequently, it will be that employer that acts as the actual data controller of such processing. As part 
of their agreement of employment, most employees will be directly subjected to their employer and 
will thus not be an external party contracted for this processing. As a result, regular employees will not 
be considered as being the processor of such personal data processing. While not being the actual 
controller or processor of the personal data processing, employees must comply with the means and 
purposes on the processing of personal data determined by their employer.  
With regards to the assistive technologies mentioned in the scenarios, it will be important to 
know whether and how they comply with those means set by the data processor. A screen reader 
could, for instance, log the data it is being fed for conversion to speech. If such data logs would exist, 
they could also include personal data. As a result, it would be important to assess how and for what 
period of time such logs are stored, for what purpose, what data they contain precisely and by whom 
they can be accessed.  
 
Here, one will have to assess how the assistive technologies used by Anna fit into the 
requirements set to the processing of personal data. For instance, does the screen reader log the data it 
reads to Anna? If so, it will be important to know how such logs are stored and who can access them. 
This can be summarized in the following requirements:  
Req. C7: The precise capacity in which one party performs personal 
data processing on behalf of another party must be clearly 
established. Employees must be clearly identified as such in order to 
distinguish them from their employer/data controller and the 
external processor. 
Req. C8: In order to determine their compliance with the means and 
purposes of a personal data processing, assistive technologies must 
clearly indicate whether, how and for what period of time logs 
containing personal data are stored, for what purpose, what data 
they contain precisely and by whom they can be accessed.  
4.2 Informed consent requirements 
The analysis of the personas and the scenarios demonstrated a number of legal implications with 
regards to consent. While consent is generally understood as being an integral part of the general 
European legal framework regarding the processing of personal data – and was therefore already 
analyzed under D7.1 Legal Requirements for Trust in the IoT – the specific situations in terms of needs 
and goals of the personas and the visualization of potential solutions in the scenarios demonstrate 
certain legal implications that require the general legal requirements relating to consent previously 
developed to be analyzed deeper and to be developed further.  
 
It is in particular the Trusted Smart Home health monitoring system that gives rise to these legal 
implications with regards to consent. While the health monitoring system itself will be analyzed as well 
– under chapter 4.3 – Health monitor requirements – the specific issue of consent should be addressed 
separately as consent is an important element in all types of personal data processing and potential 
privacy infringements.  
 
In the analysis of the needs and goals of the personas and of the possible solutions developed in 
the scenarios, two specific issues relating to consent were identified: How can informed consent be 
effectively given here and are certain persons still legally capable of providing their consent? While this 
chapter will analyze the general legal background regarding consent and legal capacity, one should also 
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refer to national law for the specific requirements regarding legal capacity and possible delegations 
thereof as such is not regulated at a European level.  
4.2.1 Effectiveness of consent 
From the analysis of the personal attitudes of the personas towards new technologies, it became 
clear that privacy policies and consent forms are not often fully read, let alone fully understood. This 
attitude may stem from a general sense of mistrust in new technologies, or unfamiliarity therewith, 
which eventually leads to the perception that the technical aspects of the technology and the legal 
aspects of the privacy policies and consent forms are too difficult to grasp. Alternatively, one can also 
distinguish people with a feeling of overconfidence in technology, which will not read privacy policies 
and consent forms because they trust that technology will not harm them. While these personal 
attitudes may be rather divergent, they do lead to the same consequence: by not reading or 
understanding privacy policies and consent forms, both types of persons are exposed to the risk of 
providing consent without knowing to which they consented.  
 
The problem created by these attitudes towards consent forms and privacy policies 
demonstrates two underlying issues.  
First, privacy policies and consent forms are often regarded as being too technical or legal, thus 
becoming almost unintelligible to people without a strong technical and/or legal background. Consent 
forms and privacy policies must therefore be drafted keeping in mind their target audience, which 
mostly consists of people that have no particular experience with technology and that are not legally 
trained. Also, one should pay attention to the presentation of the consent form or privacy policy. A long 
and detailed text is less likely to be read than a comprehensive and structured overview. However, as 
the level of detail in the text is often the result of legal obligations to include all information needed for 
the data subject to provide his fully informed consent, one should try to strike a balance between these 
legal obligations and the need of many people to be presented a comprehensible privacy policy or 
consent form.  
Second, one should look into the effectiveness of privacy policies and consent forms. This 
becomes especially apparent in the context of the Internet, where a simple ‘click-to-accept’-button will 
lead many users to clicking that button without having read the text, thus consenting to the processing 
of their personal data, unaware of the specifics of such processing. One should therefore try to device a 
way of ensuring that privacy policies and consent forms are fully read and understood before 
acceptance, while on the other hand maintaining a level of user-friendliness.  
 
The Data Protection Directive – Directive 95/46/EC – lists a number of grounds that can 
legitimate the processing of one’s personal data. However, most of these grounds will only apply in a 
limited number of relatively rare cases, thus making the first legitimization ground, informed consent, 
the most valuable ground for a legitimate processing of personal data. While this idea of consent was 
originally viewed as an expression of the right to informational self-determination of the data subject 
and of user empowerment, the rise of electronic communications and its reliance on consent has lead 
to a certain undervaluation of this concept [KOSTA 2011]. While the situation described here leads to 
the questions as to how the data subject should be adequately and understandably informed and how 
the data subject should express his consent, one could also question whether consent is still an 
adequate tool for user empowerment and informational self-determination. While certain provisions16 
already indicate that consent may one day serve a less important role, such change is not likely to be 
implemented in the European legal framework on data protection soon.  
 
For the time being one will still have to obtain the data subject’s informed consent, thus 
warranting the development of a set of criteria regarding how to properly inform the data subject in 
order to receive his consent and regarding how to ensure that the data subject has actually read and 
                                                          
16
 For instance, the Swedish exemption of unstructured processing of personal data results in Internet users not 
being required to obtain consent from every person they mention in their online activities [KOSTA 2011]. 
07/09/2011 
Page 22 / 52 
understood all information given to him before granting his consent. As defined by the Data Protection 
Directive, informed consent needs to be given freely and specific. The matter of freely given consent 
will be explored further in the following chapter of this deliverable, chapter 4.2.2 – Capacity to consent.  
 
Requirements relating to the provision of adequate information to the data subject were already 
developed under the previous deliverable D7.1 – Legal Requirements for Trust in the IoT. There, it was 
found that a layered approach – with a short, a condensed and a full notice – would be the most 
adequate way to inform the data subject and to receive his consent. Also standardized forms were 
encouraged to ensure that all privacy policies and consent forms are similarly accessible.17 
 
The requirements developed before can be summarized as follows:  
Req. D1: Carefully drafted privacy policies and consent forms – for 
instance in a multi-layered format – are required to ensure 
compliance to the requirement of consent and the right to 
information. Note that such privacy policies and consent forms need 
to be compliant with national data protection legislation. For 
instance, certain jurisdictions require written consent, while others 
allow for implicit consent in many cases.   
 
Such layered consent form should already make the form more readable and accessible to a 
larger non-technical and not legally trained audience. However, one will still need to ensure that the 
people that normally ignore consent forms and privacy policies are now persuaded to actually read such 
information before granting their consent. Here, one could think of technological measures that could 
be implemented to, for instance, require the user to scroll through the privacy policy before being able 
to grant his consent. Imperative here is that user-friendliness is observed. Most users are not likely to 
be willing to spend a lot of time going through the procedure of granting consent before being able to 
use a service, such as a social network. A balance needs to be struck between the legitimate interests of 
the data controller – for which he needs the data subject’s consent – and the privacy of the data subject 
[KOSTA 2011].  
Req. D2: User-friendliness must be the focal point in obtaining the 
data subject’s consent. While unintelligible texts may lead to the data 
subject not reading a privacy policy or consent form, elaborate 
procedures to grant consent may result in the data subject refraining 
from using such service, thus damaging the business of the data 
controller. A balance between the interests of both parties must 
therefore be struck.   
4.2.2 Capacity to consent 
 As already indicated, a second component of the consent issue concerns the capacity to give 
one’s consent. Also, as the Data Protection Directive requires consent to be given freely, one should 
look into whether consent can truly be given freely. For instance, as found in the scenarios, elderly 
persons with health concerns could be subjected to a health monitoring system in order to maintain a 
certain level of independence. The question is then whether such trade-off still be considered as freely 
given consent. Also, as the specific case developed in the scenarios here involves a person with onsets 
of dementia, one should ask whether such person can still be considered as capable of providing 
consent.  
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While the Data Protection Directive does not directly refer to the capacity of the data subject to 
grant his consent, there is a provision that allows for personal data processing to protect the vital 
interests of the data subject when he is physically or legally incapable of granting his consent.18 This 
provision relates to the processing of so-called sensitive data, which in principle is prohibited and can 
only occur in a select number of strict cases. Such may give an indication of the need to have the legal 
and physical capability to provide informed consent.  
This problem also becomes apparent when the data subject is a minor. While minors in principle 
do not have legal capacity, they may already have certain legal competences under different national 
legislations. The national differences regarding age and scope of legal competence of minors makes it 
difficult to establish a common point of view regarding the capability of minors to grant their consent to 
the processing of their personal data. One could therefore recommend seeking consent of both the 
minor data subject and its parents or legal guardians [KOSTA 2011]. Such would also assist in securing 
validity of the consent when this validity is being judged in court. 
As it is clear that the data subject’s statutory or legal representative can provide consent for the 
data subject, this would indicate a similar situation to that of minors: while the legal capacity of elderly, 
especially when facing a mental illness, depends on divergent national legislations and would have to 
be judged on a case-by-case basis, one could best seek the consent of both the data subject and his 
legal representatives, where available. 
Req. D3: When dealing with minors, elderly and/or persons with a 
mental illness, the data controller is advised to seek consent from 
both the data subject and its statutory or legal guardians. The general 
legal capacity of the data subject determines its capacity to consent.  
 
As a person’s mental state can also change over time, one may argue in favor of consent with 
limited duration. In such case, consent should be regularly renewed. This is specifically important for 
cases of continuously ongoing processing of personal data. 
Req. D5: Consent should be limited in time and should be renewed for 
continuously ongoing processing of personal data. Consent should 
also be revocable.  
 
Second, the Data Protection Directive requires consent to be given freely, without any third party 
pressure. Such third party pressure or influence, however, can be found in many places. For instance, 
one can think of the unequal relationship between an employee and its employer. As one party, the 
employer, clearly has the beneficial position in the relationship, one may ask whether an employee is 
truly free to consent on the processing of his personal data.  
As a result, one may even question the use of requiring consent in such unequal relationships. 
With regards to the processing of personal data of employees, the Article 29 Working Party holds that  
reliance on consent should be confined to cases where the worker has a 
genuine free choice and is subsequently able to withdraw the consent 
without detriment [WORKING PARTY 48].  
In unequal relationships, it would therefore be advised to seek a different ground for personal 
data processing, as freely given informed consent – as required by the Data Protection Directive – 
cannot be provided. 
 
One should, however, make a distinction between the types of external pressure exercised on 
the data subject. One may distinguish positive pressure and negative pressure [KOSTA 2011].  If the 
person, for instance, knows he can expect a certain benefit from granting his consent, he was externally 
influenced. However, if he was properly informed and still had real freedom in deciding on whether to 
consent or not, this positive pressure cannot be seen as invalidating his freely given consent. However, 
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when duress is employed, it is clear that the data subject’s freedom of choice was limited, thus 
invalidating his consent as it could not be truly freely given. External pressure on the data subject’s 
consent should therefore be classified as being either coercive or persuasive, with the former being 
negative pressure and the later being positive pressure.  
Req. D4: Informed consent must be given freely. In order to 
determine whether the data subject’s consent was given freely, one 
needs to analyze the external pressure exercised on his decision. 
Positive persuasion cannot invalidate his freely given consent, while 
negative coercion will invalidate his consent as it could not have been 
given freely.  
4.3 Health monitor requirements 
One of the main features developed under the Smart Home scenario is the Trusted Smart Home 
health monitoring system. While such system certainly promises practical benefits to the person that 
requires health monitoring, his relatives and healthcare workers, there are also a number of legal 
questions to be formulated with regards to the precise workings of such system.  
First, as it is clear that such system may include the processing of personal data and as it poses an 
intrusion to the monitored person’s private life, it would be advised to obtain that person’s consent. As 
already analyzed under the previous chapter, obtaining the consent of a person that requires medical 
surveillance may pose problems with regards to his capacity to consent and whether such consent was 
freely given or was the result of certain coercion. The specific legal requirements resulting from this 
analysis were formulated under the previous chapter.  
Second, the scenario shows a large number of features that could be included under the 
umbrella of the Trusted Smart Home health monitoring system, such as home access control and 
management, medicine management and location tracking. As each of these features poses an 
individual intrusion to the private life of the person under surveillance, one should ask whether all of 
these features are necessary and whether they really need to be active continuously. This raises 
questions with regards to the adaptability of the features of this system to the user’s wishes and with 
regards to its processing of personal data.  
Third, as the scenario demonstrates that this system is capable of collecting and processing 
substantial amounts of data, amongst which also personal data, and as this system is specifically aimed 
for use in a medical context, one may assume that health data concerning the person under 
surveillance will be processed. As this type of personal data has been considered as a special category 
of personal data under the European legal framework on data protection, one will have to assess 
whether specific requirements and procedures go accompanied with it.  
4.3.1 Adaptability of the health monitoring system 
A first question to be answered here is whether it can be found acceptable that the health 
monitoring system continuously processes large amounts of data, amongst which personal data and 
whether the system should be adaptable to the specific needs and desires of the data subject. Can the 
purpose definition of health monitoring justify that a person is monitored at all times for an unspecified 
period of time? Is it acceptable that a person’s consent to being monitored for health purposes exposes 
him to a number of additional features, some of which may be considered as intrusive? 
 
To answer this question, one will have to refer to the principles relating to data quality as found 
under article 6 of the Data Protection Directive. This article states that personal data must be processed 
fairly and lawfully, for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes, that only accurate and up-to-date 
data may be processed in an adequate, relevant and non-excessive manner and with storage no longer 
than necessary for the purposes of the processing. These provisions may aid in determining the scope 
of the health monitoring system with regards to data protection and the possibility of user adaptation.  
 
07/09/2011 
Page 25 / 52 
First, one must examine the proportionality principle, which underlies much of the principles 
relating to data quality of the Data Protection Directive. This principle holds that one needs to balance 
the legitimate interests of the data controller and those of the data subject by ensuring that an 
excessive intrusion to the data subject’s privacy is avoided. Therefore, it must be assessed whether the 
means used in the processing – in casu the house access management, the medicine management and 
the location tracking – are really suitable and necessary for the purposes of the processing – in casu the 
health monitoring – and whether there are no other options available which would yield the same 
result but that would be less privacy intrusive.  
It should be noted that the proportionality principle covers broad grounds. As a result, it is not 
limited to assessing whether the means are suited and needed for the purposes, but also encompasses 
the idea of data minimization. This means that only the data that is strictly necessary for the purposes 
may be processed. An important distinction made here is whether there is a need to know for the data 
collected or whether that specific data is just nice to know [VAN ALSENOY 2007].   
The proportionality principle also includes storage duration, as processed personal data can only 
be stored for as long as necessary for the purposes of the processing. The scenario developed for the 
Trusted Smart Home health monitoring system indicates that the system only processes data for a 
specific action, for instance activating the access management system, emitting a warning signal or 
displaying a reminder. Once such action is completed, the purpose for which the data was collected has 
been achieved and therefore the data can no longer be stored.  
Also with regards to use, it should be reminded that the collected data can not be used for other 
purposes than to which the data subject consented upon collection and of the purposes notified to the 
competent data protection authority.  
 
As a result, one may have to assess the proportionality of the different features of the Trusted 
Smart Home health monitoring system and their potentially continuous monitoring on a case-by-case 
basis. A number of features – such as the tracking system and the fall detector – are in principle only 
activated in case of emergency. As a result, they should only process data when activated. As no data is 
processed when these features are inactive and as they are only activated when necessary, the 
processing performed by these features could be considered as being proportional as it does not 
demonstrate excessive personal data processing. This can be summarized in the following requirement:  
Req. E1: In using technologies that could potentially lead to a 
continuous collecting and processing of personal data, one must 
assess the proportionality of such collecting and processing. Mostly, 
the purpose for which the technology is used and for which the data is 
processed does not necessarily require continuous data processing. 
Therefore, one must select the least intrusive yet suitable means that 
lead to minimal data collection and storage. 
 
With regards to the adaptability of the features of the Trusted Smart Home health monitoring 
system to the data subject’s preferences, one could refer back to the previous chapter on the data 
subject’s consent. As such consent needs to be given freely, without external force applied to it, the 
processing to which he consents – and thus including the means and purposes of that processing – 
needs to be negotiable. If the data subject was coerced into consenting by his unbeneficial position, his 
consent will be void. The idea that the processing and its means and purposes need to be negotiable, 
demonstrates that the data subject can object to certain parts of the processing. For instance, within a 
health monitoring system, the data subject could consent to a fall detector that is only activated to 
collect data upon detecting a fall, while rejecting consent for a tracking device that is set to 
continuously monitor his movements. Also, as consent is revocable, the data subject may at any time 
decide to halt certain parts of the processing.  
As a result, one may find that the data subject should be offered the option to disable the 
options that are, in his personal conviction, too intrusive to his privacy. Such disconnection could be 
temporary or on a more permanent basis. This corresponds with an idea coined by the European 
07/09/2011 
Page 26 / 52 
Commission to establish a right to silence of the chips, which would give the data subject the right to 
disconnect from his networked environment at any time.19 In fact, the Commission explicitly referenced 
a household health monitoring system and added that it is a  
…prerequisite for trust and acceptance of these systems […] that 
appropriate data protection measures are put in place against possible 
misuse and other personal data related risks.20 
This analysis can be summarized into the following requirement:  
Req. E2: As consent requires certain negotiability and as consent can 
be revoked, the health monitoring system must allow for certain 
adaptability of the system to the specific needs and wishes of the 
person under medical surveillance. This person must be offered the 
option to – temporary or permanently – disable the features that he 
deems to intrusive.  
4.3.2 Processing of health data 
The second problem to be discussed here, concerns the data that will be processed in the Trusted 
Smart Home health monitoring system. As the concept of personal data needs to be interpreted rather 
broadly as in every data that could directly or indirectly lead to the identification of a natural person, 
one can expect the Trusted Smart Home health monitoring system to also process personal data. More 
importantly, this particular system concerns data relating to a person’s medical condition, which is part 
of what the Data Protection Directive addresses as a special category of personal data, also known as 
sensitive data.  
As discussed under D7.1 – Legal Requirements for Trust in the IoT, the concept of sensitive data 
can be interpreted very broadly. As the Data Protection Directive itself does not give a clear definition 
of the precise scope of this concept, one will have to look at interpretations and implementations by 
Member States. Here, it was found that a broad interpretation of the concept of sensitive data can 
certainly be defended, yet that this concept should not be stretched to its broadest sense, as such could 
lead to undesirable results [UTRUSTIT 2011b]. As a result of the broad definition of the concept of 
sensitive data, one can consider that certain of the data collected by the health monitoring system can 
be considered as being medical data, thus being sensitive data. Also the fact that all of this data is 
collected with the main purpose of monitoring a person’s health is an indication of the medical nature 
of this data.  
 
First, however, one needs to assess the applicability of the Data Protection Directive to this 
specific situation. The scenario describes the monitoring of a person within his own household, with his 
own consent and with the health monitoring system mostly being under the control of that persona’s 
son. Such could lead one to think that the household exception may apply here, as the processing is 
mainly performed within a household sphere. The involvement of external parties – the healthcare 
workers that operate under their employer, a private healthcare organization – that also play a role in 
the monitoring process, however, rules out the applicability of the household exception. The processing 
of personal data performed under the health monitoring system will therefore be fully covered by the 
scope of the Data Protection Directive and will have to comply with its specifications.  
 
Being sensitive data in the sense of article 8 of the Data Protection Directive, health data will 
need to be processed in accordance with one of the exhaustively listed justification grounds provided 
under article 8 (2). One possible justification ground applying to the health monitoring system is that of 
the data subject’s explicit consent, which has been interpreted as written consent by certain Member 
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States. One could also look at the processing necessary to protect the vital interests of the data subject 
where he is physically or legally incapable of giving his own consent. This, however, would require the 
person under medical surveillance to be declared legally incapable and being put under the custody of a 
legal guardian. Another exemption for the processing of health data requires that the processing is 
performed by a health professional and can therefore not apply to this case.21 As a result, the most 
viable justification ground for the processing of the health data of the person under medical 
surveillance will depend on his legal capacity to consent. As long as the data subject can legally give his 
own informed consent, such consent will serve as the only justification ground for the processing of his 
health data in the context of a health monitoring system. When he has been declared incapable of 
giving his consent, such processing can only be performed if it can be proved to be necessary for the 
protection of the data subject’s vital interests. This can be summarized in the following requirement:  
Req. E3: When health data is processed as part of the health 
monitoring system, the data controller is required to obtain the 
explicit – or written, where applicable – consent of the legally capable 
data subject as justification ground for the processing of this special 
category of personal data. In case of legal incapacity of the data 
subject, the processing of his health data can be performed if 
necessity for the protection of his vital interests can be demonstrated.  
 
For the requirements relating to the actual processing of health data, one can refer to the 
general requirements relating to the processing of personal data. The processing of special categories 
of personal data only deviates from these general requirements in terms of justification grounds.  
4.4 Electronic payments requirements 
In today’s society, more and more transactions no longer require the physical exchange of goods 
against cash payment, but rather rely on the electronic exchange of goods and services against 
electronic payments. Notable examples are the many application stores that provide software 
applications for different smartphone platforms. Even when a physical good is still transferred to the 
buyer, such as is the case for a vending machine, payment for these goods will more and more be 
achieved through electronic means. The scenarios developed within the uTRUSTit project reference a 
few cases in which electronic payments are made. First, there is the vending machine found in the 
Smart Break Room, where one’s uTRUSTit device can be used for both placing an order and for 
payment. In both cases, the device is waved over the appropriate area of the vending machine, thus 
completing the purchase without any physical contact. A similar case can be found in the Trusted Smart 
Home Entertainment Management application, where media data can be purchased and delivered 
electronically, thus requiring no physical contact between buyer and seller. Second, this scenario can be 
expanded to a broader context of vending machines, parking meters and Automated Teller Machines 
(ATMs), which are found in a public and thus incontrollable environment. Many public transport 
companies, for instance, are currently transgressing from distributing physical tickets to virtual tickets, 
purchased through electronic transactions. As such transactions are performed in a public and 
incontrollable environment, the need to know the trustworthiness of such transactions is heightened in 
order to ensure user trust in these transactions.  
 
This particular problem should be viewed from two angles.  
First, there is the angle of the electronic transaction itself. For this, one needs to analyze how 
legal requirements can be formulated that need to ensure that such payments are trustworthily 
executed. For this, one will have to analyze the requirements set by specific legislation relating to 
electronic transactions, such as legislation concerning e-commerce. In order to ensure that electronic 
information is truthful and trustworthy, one can also establish its authenticity and integrity, which will 
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be important to assess the legal value of said information. This analysis will be performed under this 
chapter.  
Second, one also needs to assess the technology that is used in completing such transactions. As 
the creation of the personas for this project has already indicated, there are numerous people who 
generally have a sense of mistrust towards new technologies. In order to ensure that they remain up to 
speed with ongoing technological evolutions and are thus not excluded from daily societal activities, 
one will have to demonstrate the trustworthiness of such technologies. With regards to electronic 
transactions, one can discern a sense of mistrust towards technologies that allow for wireless 
transactions, thus not requiring physical contact. More specifically, one can think of the use of RFID and 
NFC. However, also if a transaction does involve physical contact – such as when introducing a bankcard 
into an ATM – trustworthiness of the transaction will need to be ensured. The rising phenomenon of so-
called ‘skimmer’ devices22, for instance, raises questions with regards to such transactions with physical 
contact. The specific problem of assessing the trustworthiness of the technology used in transactions 
will be analyzed under chapter 4.6 (Technology requirements) of this deliverable 
 
As indicated, this chapter will focus on the legal concerns relating to the electronic transaction 
itself. First, existing legal provisions regarding such electronic payment transactions will be analyzed in 
order to formulate the legal requirements for these transactions. Second, it will be analyzed how the 
trustworthiness of electronic information can be assessed.  
4.4.1 Electronic payment transactions 
While electronic payment transactions may seem like a straightforward information society 
evolution of the age-old concept of goods-for-cash, there are a number of specific legal instruments 
dealing with different aspects of this concept.  
 
First, electronic payment transactions can be understood as an integral part of electronic 
commerce, also addressed as e-commerce. Within the European Union, e-commerce is generally 
regulated by the Directive on electronic commerce23. This directive is aimed at the services of the 
information society, which may be interpreted as  
…any service normally provided for remuneration, at a distance, by 
electronic means and at the individual request of a recipient of 
services.24  
First, the directive lists a number of information requirements. The service provider is required to 
make available information relating to his name, geographic address of establishment, contact details, 
registration number, authorization where such is required for the activity performed, possible 
professional titles or institutional affiliation and VAT number.25 Access to this information has to be 
direct, easy and permanent. Note also the provisions on commercial communications that are aimed at 
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protecting the consumer against false or misleading advertisements and unsolicited commercial 
communications, better known as spam.26 
With regards to electronic contracts, the directive requires that Member States need to ensure 
the legal validity and effectiveness of electronic contracts. Here and in addition to the previous general 
information requirements, the service provider is required to provide information regarding the 
technical steps involved in concluding the electronic contract, whether or not that contract will be filed 
by the services provider and how it can be accessed, the technical means for identifying and correcting 
input errors prior to the placing of the order and the languages offered for the conclusion of the 
contract.27 Also relevant codes of conduct, contract terms and general conditions need to be made 
available.28 
In placing the order through technological means, an electronic receipt of the order has to be 
issued, which is – together with the order itself – deemed to have been received when made accessible 
to the party to whom it is addressed.29 The user needs to be given the means to identify and correct 
input errors before placing the order.30 
 
Interestingly, the EU already addressed this issue earlier with the Directive on the protection of 
consumers in respect of distance contracts.31 These are contracts that were concluded between 
consumers and supplier under organized distance sales.32 Note, however, that article 3 of this directive 
explicitly states its non-appliance to sales using automatic vending machines. Also here, duties of 
information and confirmation are imposed onto the seller.33 The consumer is granted a seven working 
days period to withdraw from the contract.34 Note that this directive forms on of the key components 
of the European Member States’ national legal framework on consumer protection.  
 
These two directives can provide a general framework in which electronic contracts for the 
supply of goods and services can be concluded. The information and confirmation requirements listed 
here can be used as a general means to inform the consumer about the seller and the nature of the 
transaction.  
Req. F1: In electronic transactions, the service provider is required to 
inform the consumer about information relating to his name, 
geographic address of establishment, contact details, registration 
number, authorization where such is required for the activity 
performed, possible professional titles or institutional affiliation and 
VAT number. An electronic receipt of the order received must be 
issued to the consumer.  
Req. F2: In electronic transactions, the service provider is required to 
provide information regarding the technical steps involved in 
concluding the electronic contract, whether or not that contract will 
be filed by the services provider and how it can be accessed, the 
technical means for identifying and correcting input errors prior to the 
placing of the order and the languages offered for the conclusion of 
the contract, including relevant codes of conduct, contract terms and 
general conditions. 
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While the directives on e-commerce and distant contracts can provide certain general 
information requirements for the conclusion of electronic contracts, they do not provide specific 
provisions relating to electronic payments. As the scenario states that the uTRUSTit device will be used 
to perform the actual electronic payment, such indicates that this device grants the authorization to, for 
instance, the vending machine to subtract the due amount from the buyer’s account balance.  
 
This raises questions with regards to what is referred to as e-money. Within the EU, the E-Money 
Directive provides a general framework in which the Member States have to find the ground rules for 
their national implementations with regards to this topic.35 E-money is defined as  
…electronically, including magnetically, stored monetary value as 
represented by a claim on the issuer which is issued on receipt of funds 
for the purpose of making payment transactions […], and which is 
accepted by a natural or legal person other than the electronic money 
issuer”.36  
Payment transactions are defined as every  
…act, initiated by the payer or by the payee, of placing, transferring or 
withdrawing funds, irrespective of any underlying obligations between 
the payer and the payee.37  
While e-money cannot be considered to be actual money, it must be defined as being a claim on 
the bank that has created it [VAN DE VELDE 2008].38 In principle, if the monetary value would be stored 
on the device, such would make the uTRUSTit devices application a payment service, thus making the 
provider of this service a payment institution.39 This, however, would subject the provider of this service 
to the strict conditions for being granted the authorization to act as a payment institution within the 
EU. 
However, article 3 (j) of Directive 2007/64/EC holds that these provisions are not applicable to 
…services provided by technical service providers, which support the 
provision of payment services, without them entering at any time into 
possession of the funds to be transferred, including processing and 
storage of data, trust and privacy protection services, data and entity 
authentication, information technology (IT) and communication 
network provision, provision and maintenance of terminals and devices 
used for payment services.  
As it is the scope of the uTRUSTit project to augment trust in these wireless mobile payments, the 
uTRUSTit application providing for NFC payments could be considered as being such technical service. 
As a result, the application will have to act as an intermediary, never taking possession of any funds to 
be transferred. The application needs to be limited to mainly aiding in trust and privacy protection and 
in providing for data and entity authentication.  
Req. F3: The application allowing the use of the uTRUSTit device for 
NFC payments must explicitly state that it is a service provided by a 
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technical service provider that is aimed at only supporting payment 
services, trust and privacy protection services and data and entity 
authentication. No funds to be transferred may be taken into 
possession at any time.  
 
Other legislation is aimed at regulating the electronic transfer of funds, for instance the Belgian 
Act of 17 July 2002.40 This act defines an instrument for the electronic transfer of funds as each means 
that makes it possible to realize certain actions partly or totally via an electronic way, including the 
transfer of funds, withdrawals and deposits of cash, access at a distance to an account and charging and 
discharging of a chargeable instrument.41 Payments through mobile phones could be understood as 
payments using a chargeable instrument [VAN DE VELDE 2008].42 The issuer of an instrument for the 
electronic transfer of funds is each person who, in his commercial activity, puts an instrument for the 
electronic transfer of funds at the disposal of another person.43 
This Act imposes very strict information duties on the issuer and holds clear and strict provisions 
on his duties and liabilities. Also here, it will therefore be necessary to argue that the provider of the 
uTRUSTit mobile NFC payments application is a mere intermediary and stores no information, therefore 
not falling under the scope of the act. Note, however, that divergent national legislations could lead to 
different interpretations of these concepts.  
4.4.2 Trustworthiness of electronic information 
Another issue with regards to electronic transactions is the trustworthiness of the electronic 
information that is conveyed to the buyer. While the previously discussed legislation – such as the E-
Commerce Directive – imposes certain information duties on the seller, there are no direct guarantees 
that this information is correct. This concern was also present in the personas developed for the 
uTRUSTit project. How can one be sure that the information given by a computer is truthful?  
 
This concern relates to the trustworthiness of electronic information. Establishing the 
trustworthiness of electronic information is also important to assess the legal evidential value of that 
information. In general, one can refer to the use of electronic signatures and other techniques to 
establish the authenticity and integrity of electronic information.  
 
Historically, many legal systems have given preference to written evidence, preferably with a 
handwritten signature.44 As it is clear that such handwritten signature cannot be used in an electronic 
context, one will have to find alternatives. The EU has therefore chosen to implement electronic 
signatures, stating that a signature in electronic form may not be denied legal effectiveness and 
admissibility as evidence in legal proceedings solely on the grounds that it is in electronic form.45 The EU 
also foresees in an advanced electronic signature, in which a combination of a hashing technique and 
asymmetric encryption needs to ensure that the signed electronic document was not altered since the 
moment of signing and to establish authorship of the signature. An even more advanced electronic 
signature, the qualified electronic signature, adds the use of qualified certificates issued by a qualified 
certificate service provider that guarantees the identity of the signatory. Such qualified electronic 
signature must be awarded the same legal value as a handwritten signature.46   
                                                          
40
 Act of 17 July 2002 on the transactions executed using instruments for the electronic transfer of funds, Belgian 
State Gazette 17 August 2002.  
41
 Article 2, 1° Act of 17 July 2002.  
42
 Article 2, 2° Act of 17 July 2002.  
43
 Article 2, 3° Act of 17 July 2002.  
44
 Note that a handwritten signature is generally understood as the classical signature written using a pen – or 
similar device – on paper – or similar information carrier. This excludes all use of electronic means.  
45
 Article 5 (2) Directive 1999/93/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 1999 on a 
Community framework for electronic signatures, OJ L 13 of 19 January 2000, 12-20. 
46
 Article 5 (1) Directive 1999/93/EC.  
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While the electronic signature has been implemented by all EU Member States and has been 
accorded reasonable legal value, it may not be the most ideal instrument in establishing authorship of a 
document and whether the document has been altered, also known as the integrity of the document 
[DEKEYSER 2006]. For one, the electronic signature relies on contextual information to establish 
authorship, as the signature itself is a mere code. Also, the electronic signature only provides for 
integrity at the level of the bitstream, not at the level of the document itself. While a single change in a 
bit of a file could thus damage its integrity, the actual document contained in the file may not be 
altered at all.  
 
One could therefore recommend establishing means to assess the authenticity and the integrity 
of electronic information, which should provide for the trustworthiness of the electronic document. An 
example is the invoice sent by electronic means, for which a directive has established that it must be 
accepted by Member States if the authenticity of the origin and the integrity of the content are 
guaranteed.47 A 2010 amendment to this provision adds definitions48:  
‘Authenticity of the origin’ means the assurance of the identity of the 
supplier or the issuer of the invoice. 
‘Integrity of the content’ means that the content required according to 
this Directive has not been altered. 
Any taxable person is free to determine his means of choice to guarantee authenticity, integrity 
and legibility of his invoices. Business controls that create a reliable audit trail between invoice and 
supplied goods or services are recommended. Electronic signatures and Electronic Data Interchange 
(EDI) is allowed as well. While originally the electronic signature and EDI were the only accepted means 
to guarantee authenticity and integrity, the EU has now decided to give the taxable person free choice, 
while giving preference to the use of audit trails.  
 
Audit trails provide a complete log of all transactions pertaining to specific information 
performed by users or systems. They can be used to trace the origins and whereabouts of information 
and can as such provide proof of the authenticity of a document and of the document’s integrity. With 
relation to electronic payments transactions, audit trails would be able to guarantee that the author of 
certain information is truly who he claims to be – for instance, that the author is a bank and not a 
fraudster posing as a bank – and that the information he transmits has not been altered – which may 
occur if someone intercepts the data.  
Req. F4: In order to establish the trustworthiness of electronic 
information relating to electronic payment transactions, the uTRUSTit 
mobile NFC payment application is required to guarantee the 
authenticity and the integrity of the information. The preferred 
method for providing authenticity and integrity is the use of audit 
trails, while in secondary order electronic signatures and EDI may be 
used.  
4.5 Security and access management requirements 
Both the Smart Home and the Smart Office scenario displayed a clear need for security and 
access management, including the possibility for remote access control. This access management 
ranges from a household’s or office’s doors or a medicine cabinet to media centers, wireless networks 
or cloud storage access management. Regardless of whether or not a certain individual person has 
                                                          
47
 Article 233 Directive 2006/112/EC of the Council of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added 
tax, OJ L 347 of 11 December 2006, 1-118.  
48
 Article 1 (22) Directive 2010/45/EU of the Council of 13 July 2010 amending Directive 2006/112/EC on the 
common system of value added tax as regards the rules on invoicing, OJ L 189 of  22 July 2010, 1-8.  
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indicated that security is important to him or her, adequate security features are imperative for any 
trustworthy product or service when dealing with the number of interconnections and subsequent 
potential security risks posed by the IoT. Also from a legal point of view, security has become the 
subject of specific legal provisions, mainly with regards to the storage of personal data for the 
processing thereof. Specific requirements looking at security and access management from a legal 
perspective are therefore needed. 
 
Two key components can be distinguished here. First, one will need to assess the confidentiality 
component. This component concerns security and access management in its purest form, namely 
deciding who can enter a certain room or building and who can access certain systems, networks and 
data. Second, one will need to assess the security of the access management system. What technical 
and organizational measures are required to guarantee that no unauthorized access is granted?   
4.5.1 Confidentiality requirements 
The most important component of security and access management is to maintain 
confidentiality. In essence, this means ensuring that only authorized users are able to gain access to 
specific facilities, such as a house, computer systems and networks or data. While such access control 
may seem like a purely technical or organizational issue, the concept of confidentiality has also been 
included in certain legislation. The most important legal provisions relating to confidentiality can be 
found in the Data Protection Directive.  
 
From article 16 of the Data Protection Directive follows that only authorized persons should be 
granted access to the personal data stored for processing. Also, from a combined reading with the 
proportionality principle, one can deduct that the persons granted access to personal data for their 
processing under the authority of the data controller – including the processor – should limit their 
processing to what is instructed to them by the controller or by law [VAN ALSENOY 2011]. This implies a 
double restriction. First, it needs to be decided who needs to be granted access to the personal data for 
his processing duties. Second, when authorized to access data, one still needs to be limited to 
processing only the personal data strictly instructed to be processed by the data controller or by law.  
 
While article 16 of the Data Protection Directive is aimed at ensuring the confidentiality of the 
processing of personal data, it provides a general sense of the basic requirements that could apply to all 
access management systems. Not only is it important to clearly delineate who can be granted access to 
certain facilities, it should also be specified how far these access rights go. For instance in the Smart 
Office scenario it may be necessary to grant a visitor access to the company’s wireless network, while 
limiting that access to Internet use only and thus not allowing this user access to the company’s internal 
network data.  
 
Also, as already can be deducted from previous analyses, the Smart Home and Smart Office 
solutions developed in the scenarios display a number of cases in which personal data are processed, 
notably the Smart Home health monitoring system. For the personal data processed there, the 
provisions of the Data Protection Directive relating to confidentiality and security are of capital 
importance. In the case of the health monitoring system, for instance, it was found that health data 
relating to the data subject would be processed. As health data is considered as a special category of 
personal data under the Data Protection Directive, more specific and strict rules will apply. In relation to 
data confidentiality, in particular, this means that in principle only the healthcare provider involved in 
treating or taking care of the patient should be granted access to the data. For the case of the medicine 
cabinet developed within the Smart Home scenario, the health data should in principle only be made 
available to the prescribing physician, the pharmacist and the personal healthcare worker.  
 
In general, the data controller would be required to make an inventory of the different types of 
personal data that will be processed. Subsequently, he needs to divide the persons acting under his 
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authority into different groups relating to the specific information necessary for them to perform the 
processing to which they were instructed. These different groups can subsequently be granted access 
to the personal data they need. The idea of implementing different levels of access and different groups 
of users can prove valuable in all types of access management and should thus not be limited to the 
context of confidentiality for personal data processing.  
 
One can therefore distinguish four stages of granting access [VAN ALSENOY 2007]. 
First, users need to be registered by the access controller in order to assign them their specific 
credentials that will be used in providing them access to certain facilities. This will ensure that all users 
within the access management system are known and given specific access rights.  
Second, the user will need to identify himself. This will include the user procuring the identifier to 
which they agreed upon, which can be his real name, a user name or an identification number.  
Third, the user is authenticated. Here, it is verified whether the claim made by the user in stating 
his identifier was correct. This is the most critical step in the process, as it needs to be verified whether 
the user is truly who he claims to be or whether he is a fraudster. Here, one can ask him for specific 
evidence to back his claim, for instance by providing something only the real user can know – such as a 
password – something only the real user owns – such as an identification card – or something only the 
real user can be – as in biometric credentials.  
Last, the user is authorized. This means that he has been granted access in accordance with the 
credentials issued to him.  
 
These findings can be summarized in the following requirements. 
Req. G1: In the processing of personal data, the data controller is 
required to restrict access to this personal data to the persons that 
need such access for the processing they perform under his authority. 
Such access need to comply with the proportionality principle, 
meaning that no user may be awarded access to more data than 
strictly required for his processing tasks.  
Req. G2: In order to achieve such proportional access control, the data 
controller is required to provide for differentiated access levels for 
different user groups. This should be combined with an access 
procedure that includes registration, identification, authentication 
and authorization.  
Req.G5: While previous requirements only apply in the context of the 
processing of personal data, adherence thereto in other cases of 
access management is strongly recommended as they provide 
valuable minimal requirements.  
4.5.2 Security requirements 
Apart from deciding who is authorized to access certain facilities and how far that access goes, 
one will also have to adopt appropriate technical and organizational measures to enforce that access 
control. Within the context of the processing of personal data, article 17 (1) of the Data Protection 
Directive holds that the data controller needs to take  
…appropriate technical and organizational measures to protect 
personal data against accidental or unlawful destruction or accidental 
loss, alteration, unauthorized disclosure or access […] and against all 
other unlawful forms of processing.  
The current state of the art, the costs of implementation, the nature of the data and the nature 
of the risks are taken into account when judging whether the measures taken were appropriate. This 
wording does, however, indicate that the obligation on the data controller is merely an obligation of 
means – as he promises to perform to the best of his ability – and not an obligation of result – where he 
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is kept to achieve a certain result [VAN ALSENOY 2007]. The data controller does, however, have the 
duty to ensure that his security policy remains up to date with the ever-evolving standards in security.  
 
With regards to that state of the art, one may notice a few important points that are not directly 
addressed by the Data Protection Directive, but which should be taken into account in adequate 
security policies.  
First, it should be noted that the European Commission has indicated to  
…examine the modalities for the introduction in the general legal 
framework of a general personal data breach notification, including the 
addressees of such notifications and the criteria for triggering the 
obligation to notify.49 
This development has already received support from the Article 29 Working Party [WORKING 
PARTY 184]. Such general duty of notification of data breaches is aimed at ensuring that data subjects 
whose personal data may be affected by the data breach are timely informed of this breach and can 
take appropriate measures to protect their data, such as blocking their credit card when the card 
number was made public in a data breach. While this is not aimed at preventing data breaches due to 
unauthorized access, adequate handling of such breach should be included in security policies.50 
Second, the state of the art concerning data security should include strong encryption. In order to 
avoid the principles contained in the Data Protection Directive and subsequent national 
implementations to become quickly outdated due to rapid technological advancements, it was decided 
to maintain a level of technological neutrality. As a result, the need for cryptography was not 
specifically addressed, although it should by current standards of security be considered as a staple in 
security policies. The use of cryptography should therefore clearly be addressed in a security policy.51 
Last, implementing adequate security measures should also keep user-friendliness in mind. As 
indicated in the development of the personas, not all users are willing to be subjected to security 
policies that require too elaborate procedures. In order to prevent users from refraining from using 
systems or applications with perceived difficult security procedures or in order to prevent users from 
simply disabling security features, one will have to ensure that adequate security requires minimal user 
effort and can run mainly on the background without requiring active user input.  
 
Article 17 (2) of the Data Protection Directive holds that also the processor must be chosen to 
provide sufficient security guarantees. It is the data controller who must ensure compliance with the 
technical and organizational measures chosen. A written contract or legal act must bind the data 
controller and the processor, ensuring that the processor will only act on instructions of the data 
controller and the obligations relating to the technical and organizational measures to be taken also 
rest on the processor. Such contract between data controller and processor could also serve as a means 
to clearly indicate their respective roles and liabilities in the processing of personal data.   
 
The Data Protection Directive also allows for the Member States to adopt additional measures 
relating to data security. For one, the Belgian Data Protection Act holds in its article 16, §2 that the data 
controller must keep the data up to date and remove inaccurate, incomplete or irrelevant data, that he 
must ensure data confidentiality, that he must inform the persons acting under his authority about the 
provisions of the act and its implementing decrees and that he must assure that the programs used for 
the automatic processing of personal data are in accordance with the statements made in the 
notification to the national supervisory authority and that no unlawful use is made thereof.  
                                                          
49
 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the Economic and Social 
Committee and the Committee of the Regions of 4 November 2010, “A comprehensive approach on personal data 
protection in the European Union”, COM(2010) 609, 7. 
50
 The need for timely notification was stressed clearly in the recent Sony hacks [STUART 2011]. 
51
 Recent hacks have, however, indicated that encryption is still not always used as a security measure 
[GOODWINS 2011].  
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Note that the Belgian national supervisory authority has also advised to adopt a system for audit 
trails.52 By logging and tracing all activities, one can later find who accessed particular facilities – 
including rooms, computer systems and data – and what activities where performed after gaining such 
access. However, as such extensive logging is a form of personal data processing in itself, one will need 
to take suitable security precautions when setting up such system for audit trails.  
 
Again, as the principles explicated here are aimed at ensuring data security in the processing of 
personal data, they do not directly apply to general access management systems. However, as the 
uTRUSTit scenarios indicate a few instances in which personal data will be processed one will need to 
provide an adequate level of security for this data. Also, given the importance of these personal data 
security principles within the European legal framework on data protection, one may refer to them as 
general obligations, which could easily be transposed to other types of security and access 
management. Note, however, that these obligations should be interpreted as being minimal 
obligations. One will always have to keep in mind the current state of the art in data security.  
Req. G3: In the processing of personal data, the data controller is 
required to adopt appropriate and state of the art technical and 
organizational measures to ensure data security. Also the processor 
needs to be bound to such security policy.  
Req. G4: Such security policy should include, inter alia, actions to be 
taken in case of data breach, the use of cryptography to protect data 
and audit trails to log and trace data access and use. These security 
policies also need to take into account user-friendliness and should 
require minimal user effort.  
Req. G5: While previous requirements only apply in the context of the 
processing of personal data, adherence thereto in other cases of 
security and access management is strongly recommended as they 
provide valuable minimal requirements.  
4.6 Technology requirements 
As indicated in the scenarios developed under Deliverable 2.2 – Definition of User Scenarios – the 
different IoT solutions envisioned within the uTRUSTit project rely on the use of various technologies. 
The specific technologies listed here include Radio-Frequency Identification (RFID), Global Positioning 
System (GPS), Near Field Communication (NFC), Bluetooth and Wi-Fi. As already indicated in chapter 
4.2.9 – Radio-frequency identification – of Deliverable 7.1 – Legal Requirements for Trust in the IoT – 
the use of technologies such as RFID may pose certain privacy concerns. As a result, the use of these 
technologies will have to be analyzed from a legal point of view in order to develop specific legal 
requirements to which this use will have to correspond.  
 
The need for such specific legal requirements for the use of these technologies can be deducted 
from the analysis of the personas developed under Deliverable 2.1 – Personas. As certain users may 
have a general sense of mistrust towards new technologies, one will have to assure these users that the 
use of these technologies is bound to specific requirements and that its use can therefore be 
considered as trustworthy. Such trust building will be necessary to ensure that these users are not 
excluded from daily societal activities due to their refraining from adapting to technological evolutions.  
 
For the purposes of developing these requirements, the focus will lie on the specific technologies 
listed in the scenarios. The goal, however, is to develop the requirements in a more technology neutral 
manner, so as to allow for application thereof to other technologies not specifically mentioned within 
the Smart Home or Smart Office scenario. As briefly indicated under chapter 4.4 – Electronic payments 
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requirements – of this deliverable, potential risks of data breaches and fraud are not limited to the use 
of wireless technologies. Also ATMs that require physical contact between the system and the user’s 
bankcard, for instance, could be exposed to risks such as skimming.  
4.6.1 General privacy concerns 
The use of RFID technology was already analyzed under chapter 4.2.9 – Radio-frequency 
identification – of Deliverable 7.1 – Legal Requirements for Trust in the IoT. In this analysis, it was found 
that RFID is considered as an important building block for the IoT, but that certain privacy concerns, for 
instance regarding the transparency of the use of this technology, remain [UTRUSTIT 2011b]. Several 
bodies – including the European Commission, the EDPS and the Article 29 Working Party – have already 
issued opinions on the use of RFID, where the general consensus is that no specific legal framework for 
the use of this technology is required. As a result, the use of RFID is considered to be covered by the 
Data Protection Directive, thus requiring such use to be subjected to the general principles concerning 
data protection.  
 
In particular, the Article 29 Working Party brought two issues to the forefront: awareness and 
deactivation [Working Party 105; UTRUSTIT 2011b]. First, the data subject needs to be made aware of 
the presence of RFID tags around him. As RFID tags can made to be very small, they can easily be 
hidden – for instance in the seams of clothes – thus not being noticeable to the data subject. By clearly 
indicating the presence of RFID tags, data subjects may become more confident towards this 
technology. Second, the purpose of the RFID tags should be limited and they should be deactivated 
when their purpose has been attained. In the case of a security tag, for instance, the tag on an item 
should be disabled after its purchase. As a result, the data subject should be made aware of the activity 
of the RFID tags in his surroundings and should know whether they are – or can be – deactivated.  
 
In order to ensure that future RFID applications are compliant with general privacy regulations 
and the specific provisions of the legal framework on data protection, a Privacy Impact Assessment 
(PIA) was proposed. Such assessment would analyze the potential privacy and data protection concerns 
to be made with regards to proposed future RFID applications. Taking into account the results of this 
assessment, producers of RFID applications should thus ensure that their product is fully compliant 
before it enters the market. Such proactively ensuring privacy compliance is part of what is generally 
referred to as privacy by design. 
 
Privacy by design aims to achieve privacy compliance of technology from its creation on, not by 
ex post assessment and subsequent modifications. In this vision, privacy compliance should become the 
default mode of operation and not an afterthought. While Privacy-Enhancing Technologies (PETs) were 
originally seen as potential tools to augment privacy implementation, privacy by design is now 
recommended as a means to maintain full functionality in an organization while at the same time 
promoting privacy.53 In general, one can distinguish seven foundational principles for privacy by design 
[CAVOUKIAN 2009]. 
First, privacy by design should be characterized by its proactive nature. It is not aimed at ex post 
reactions against privacy infringements, but at taking actions before such invasion occurs. 
Second, privacy by design aims to have full privacy protection as an automatic given in any IT 
system or business practice. One should not have to opt-in into better privacy settings as these should 
be the default option. 
Third, privacy should be included in the basic design of the system or business from the very 
beginning, not an extra feature that is added later. By embedding privacy, it becomes a core 
component.  
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Fourth, privacy by design aims to maintain full functionality. It aims at demonstrating that no 
trade-offs need to be made between, for instance, privacy and security. Both can be implemented by 
making the right choices in the parties’ interests. 
Fifth, privacy should be maintained throughout the full lifecycle of the data collected.  
Sixth, visibility and transparency should be promoted for all stakeholders to see and verify that all 
stated objectives are followed.  
Seventh, privacy should be aimed at the interests of the data subject, thus including privacy 
defaults, notices and user-friendly options in all systems and businesses. User-centricity should be 
maintained.  
 
These findings can be summarized in the following requirements. 
Req. H1: Regardless of the technology used, the data subject should 
be made fully aware of the presence of the technology and of its 
activities and the possibility for deactivation.  
Req. H2: A Privacy Impact Assessment should be used to assess 
privacy compliance of technologies and applications from their 
development phase on. Such should ensure ex ante compliance with 
privacy and data protection provisions.  
Req. H3: Other privacy by design principles should be used as a 
guideline for embedding privacy compliance from the very start, thus 
avoiding later modifications aimed at achieving compliance. 
 
More in general, one should also refer to the general data protection requirements – as 
formulated in chapter 4.1 – General data protection requirements of this deliverable – and, more 
specifically, the security and access management requirements – as formulated in chapter 4.5 – 
Security and access management requirements of this deliverable. As the wireless technologies 
mentioned in the scenarios may transfer personal data during certain activities, such transfer will need 
to be adequately secured. The general data protection requirements and the security and access 
management requirements should provide for the minimal obligations to attain adequate security 
coverage.  
The need for adequate security can easily be demonstrated by the example of the Belgian Mobib 
card [VANDEZANDE 2010]. This RFID-equipped smart card is used as an electronic ticket, or e-ticket, for 
access to the Brussels public transport network. The card holds information on the user’s full name, 
date of birth, address and his last three itineraries. As it turns out, this data is not adequately secured, 
enabling anyone with a suitable RFID-reader to read and collect passengers’ personal data from a 
distance. Although the Belgian national supervisory authority, the Privacy Commission, recommended 
that customer data and e-ticket data should be kept separate and that the information on these cards 
should be secured, no additional security measures have been implemented yet [VANDEZANDE 2011]. 
Also the Dutch public transport smart card has been hacked, exposing many passengers to a potential 
data breach of their personal data [SCHELLEVIS 2011]. As more services are implementing such RFID-
based systems, or systems based on similar technologies, the need for trustworthy connections and 
data storage is becoming ever more urgent.  
4.6.2 Geolocation applications  
The technologies mentioned in the Smart Home and Smart Office scenario are not only intended 
to be used as a means for data transfer. They can also be used for geolocation and tracking purposes. In 
the scenario for the Trusted Smart Home health monitoring system, for instance, the uTRUSTit device 
can be used to locate a person requiring medical surveillance and to track his movements.  
 
The use of geolocation services, with specific relation to smart mobile devices, was the subject of 
a recent Article 29 Working Party opinion [WORKING PARTY 185]. In this opinion, the Working Party 
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remarks how all information – such as health data and financial data – can be linked to a geographic 
location and that these geolocation services therefore hold great potential impact on their users’ 
privacy. E-ticketing is named as an example where the user’s movements can be traced and – as seen in 
the Mobib example discussed earlier – where this information could be coupled to other personal data 
of this user. The Working Party describes a number of geolocation technologies, such as base station 
data, GPS and Wi-Fi.  
 
As mobile devices are closely linked to an individual, they may hold several types of personal data 
on this user. This may include sensitive data, for instance when tracking the individual’s movements to 
a hospital or religious places. Such tracking is often unnoticed by the user, for instance if an application 
runs geolocation services in the background without informing the user.  
 
Geolocation data may lead to the identification of a natural person, or may make this person 
identifiable. Therefore, this data needs to be regarded as personal data. Even when the particular 
technology used cannot provide an exact identification of the natural person, the obtained geolocation 
data should still be considered as personal data.54  
 
As a result, the provisions of the Data Protection Directive are applicable to the providers of 
geolocation services. Given the nature of such services, prior informed consent would be the most 
viable justification ground for the processing of this personal data. Consent should be revocable and 
should also be regularly renewed, thus limiting the validity of consent in time. The Working Party 
advises that the user should be made aware when geolocation services are activated, for instance by a 
visible icon. By default, such services should be switched off. Also granularity is addressed, as the 
Working Party finds that the user should be given the option to choose how precise his geolocation 
data is – ranging from State, province and city to street and number, which can also be referred to as 
“location blurring”.  
 
The findings of the Article 29 Working Party’s opinion can be formulated into general 
requirements for geolocation services.  
Req. H4: As geolocation data must be viewed as personal data, the 
processing thereof must comply with the principles of the Data 
Protection Directive and its national implementations.  
Req. H5: Prior informed consent must be obtained for the processing 
of geolocation data. This consent must be revocable and must be 
regularly renewed.  
Req. H6: Geolocation services must be switched off by default. The 
user must be made aware of active geolocation services. The user 
must also be given the option to choose the granularity of his 
consent. The user must also be given the option to opt-out from 
databases containing Wi-Fi access points.  
4.7 Intellectual property rights requirements 
The Trusted Smart Home Entertainment Management application demonstrated potential legal 
implications with regards to copyright protection. As likely most of the media to be managed, played 
and possibly shared using this application will still be subjected to copyright protection, one could have 
to ensure that the Trusted Smart Home Entertainment Management application does not actively allow 
for copyright infringements. 
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Two questions can be raised in this regard. First, could the use of the Trusted Smart Home 
Entertainment Management application, with regards to managing, playing and sharing media lead to a 
copyright infringement? Second, can the producer of the Trusted Smart Home Entertainment 
Management application be held liable if his application is misused by its users for copyright 
infringements? 
4.7.1 Possibility of copyright infringements 
In terms of managing and playing media, the Trusted Smart Home Entertainment Management 
application seems to comply with legitimate use of copyright protected media. The application is mainly 
used to manage and play media within a single household and for invited friends. If this media was 
obtained legitimately, the copyright license must have been paid and such use would therefore be 
allowed. Also temporary reproductions made in part of technological processes – such as loading the 
media in a system’s cache memory – are allowed, if these reproductions are  
…transient or incidental and an integral and essential part of a 
technological process 
and are aimed at  
…a transmission in a network between third parties by an intermediary, 
or a lawful use of a work or other subject-matter to be made, and which 
have no independent economic significance.55  
 
Sharing the media, however, may pose a different challenge. While the scenario for the Trusted 
Smart Home Entertainment Management application seems to indicate that the media is obtained 
through a trustworthy – and thus presumably legitimate – third party e-payment service and that no 
media is shared beyond the household, the wishes of the Fredrik persona indicate that he wants to 
share media data with his friends.  
In principle, copyright protection in many States holds a right to make a reproduction of the work 
for personal use within a household.56 In many cases, authors are still granted remuneration for such 
reproduction.57 In the case of media data sharing beyond a household, the right to a personal copy – as 
the reproduction for personal use is often referred to as – will be violated. It is also uncertain whether 
any remuneration to the author was paid in such sharing, unless the data was shared using a medium 
on which a compulsory copyright license fee was levied.  
Therefore, if such media data is shared beyond a single household – for instance, if the media 
data is transferred from Fredrik’s house to a friend’s house – without proper compensation to the 
copyright holders, this sharing would constitute what is widely known as media piracy. While piracy is at 
times considered as theft, the lack of actual stolen property dismisses such definition.58 Piracy should 
therefore only be considered as an infringement to the exclusive rights of the copyright holder.  
The right to a personal copy, however, has also been the center of certain controversy. In Dutch 
copyright law, for instance, it is generally accepted that the right to a personal copy does not 
discriminate on the origins of the work copied for personal use. As a result, downloading copyright 
protected works without paying compensation to the author – generally understood as illegal 
downloading – could still be regarded as the exercise of the right to a personal copy, if the downloaded 
copy is only put to personal use and thus not shared with third parties59.60 Such reasoning is rather 
                                                          
55
 Article 5 (1) Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the 
harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society, OJ L 167 of  22 June 
2001, 10-19.  
56
 For instance: Article 22, §1, 5° of the Belgian Copyright Act: Act of 30 June 1994 on authors’ rights and related 
rights, Belgian State Gazette 27 July 1994.  
57
 By compulsory licenses on media carriers, see article 55 Belgian Copyright Act.  
58
 Dowling v United States, 473 U.S. 207 (1985). 
59
 While close friends could be argued to be part of the household, such is a decision subject to the court’s 
discretion [WERKERS 2006].  
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unique as, for instance, the Belgian Copyright Act does explicitly state that the copyright protected work 
copied for personal use needs to be made public in a legitimate manner.61 Although it can be argued 
that this provision needs to be interpreted as referring to the author’s initial divulgence of his work – 
and thus not including a potentially illegally uploaded copy of the work after said divulgence – this 
reasoning is not shared by the bodies responsible for enforcing copyright within the Belgian territory.  
As a result, one can conclude that making a copyright protected work public without proper 
licensing from the holder of the copyright – such as in transferring it to a friend – will always be an 
infringement to that copyright. Illegally obtaining such works – as through illegal downloading – can 
only in highly limited cases be considered as falling under the scope of the personal copy and will 
therefore in most cases also be seen as an infringement to copyright.  
4.7.2 Producer’s liability for copyright infringements 
As it is clear that the Trusted Smart Home Entertainment Management application could be 
misused by its users for copyright infringements, one will have to assess whether the producer of such 
application can be held liable for the illegitimate practices to which the application was put to use by its 
users.  
 
The most well known example in case law to be found here is the Napster case, in which the 
producers of the Napster application were found guilty in illegally distributing copyright protected 
works.62 An important element in this case was that Napster had a large degree of control on and 
personal involvement in its network, thus being aware of the copyright infringements by its users and 
also having the possibility to interfere with such possible infringements.  
Other examples, such as Grokster, had a lesser degree of control and only provided the means to 
their users, who used these means for copyright infringements. As a result, Grokster was initially only 
held liable as contributory to the acts of their users. The US Supreme Court, however, found that 
Grokster’s behavior – in promoting itself as an alternative to Napster and gaining revenue from what it 
knew to be illegal activities by its users – was sufficient to be considered as inducing copyright 
infringements by its users.63  
Also KaZaA was found to be liable, by an Australian court, for the infringements committed by its 
users as its producers should have known that their network was used by users to commit copyright 
infringements and that they authorized such infringements by not acting against them.64 The Dutch 
Supreme Court, however, found that file sharing as a technique is no direct infringement of copyright 
and that KaZaA did not have the personal capacity to control its network in such way as to prevent its 
users from committing copyright infringements.65 As a result, KaZaA was not held liable for the actions 
of its users.  
Another example is the so-called torrent websites that host BitTorrent files that contain the 
metadata necessary to download the associated data from different users. The operators of the most 
well known example of such torrent website, The Pirate Bay, were found guilty of accessory to 
copyright infringements.66 Even though the website itself did not host any illegal content, it was found 
to have assisted illegal file sharing in such way that it constituted criminal liability for the operators of 
the website.  
                                                                                                                                                                                          
60
 Article 16b and 16c of the Act of 23 September 1912 on the new rules regarding author’s rights, Dutch State 
Gazette 1912, 308. Case law and parliamentary discussions confirm this reasoning: Gerechtshof ’s-Gravenhage, 
ACI c.s. v Stichting De Thuiskopie & SONT, 15 November 2010, LJN BO3982; Kamerstukken Tweede Kamer 28482, 
nr. 5, 2002-2003, 33. 
61
 Article 22, §1 of the Belgian Copyright Act. 
62
 A&M Records, Inc. v Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (2001). 
63
 MGM Studios, Inc. v Grokster, Ltd. 545 U.S. 913 (2005).  
64
 Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd v Sharman License Holdings Ltd., FCA 1242 (2005).  
65
 Dutch Supreme Court C02/186HR BUMA/STEMRA v Kazaa BV, 19 December 2003, LJN AN7253. 
66
 Svea Court of Appeal B 4041-09 Sony BMG Music Entertainment AB et al. v Fredrik Neij et al., 26 November 
2010.  
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These cases serve as an example that the producers of an application that could be used by its 
users for illegal file sharing may be held liable – fully or accessory – if it is found that the producers were 
aware of such illegitimate use and failed to act against it. One could therefore advise the producers of 
such applications to assess what measures could be taken against misuse by their users as such misuse 
could result in liability of the producers.  
 
One can also refer to the liability exemption of intermediary service providers, analyzed under 
chapter 5.2.2 (Liability of service providers) of D7.1 (Legal Requirements for Trust in the IoT). As 
discussed, the Internet service providers that provide to their users access to the Internet will, if they 
comply with the provisions regarding the liability exemption, not be held liable if their services fall 
under the scope of mere conduit, caching or hosting [UTRUSTIT 2011b]. This has, however, not halted 
copyright enforcement bodies to seek action against Internet service providers.67 
 
From this overview, it becomes clear that the Trusted Smart Home Entertainment Management 
application could be misused by its users for what constitutes illegal sharing of media data – namely 
sharing without proper license and without proper remuneration to the author of the copyright 
protected work. As the pursuit of such file sharing users is often costly, time consuming and raises 
questions with regards to the protection of user privacy, many authorities seek to address the providers 
of the services through which the file sharing is performed or even of the Internet service providers that 
provided Internet access to such users. Given the many differences in national legislation and the 
divergent outcomes of existing case law, it would be advised that the producers of the Trusted Smart 
Home Entertainment Management applications ensure that they cannot be held liable for potential 
misuse of these applications by their users. One important element here is that of intent: the producers 
of the applications need to clearly demonstrate that it was not their intent to have their applications 
misused for illegal file sharing. This can be formulated in the following requirement:  
Req. I1: Producers of the Trusted Smart Home Entertainment 
Management applications are required to assess whether their 
applications can be misused by users for illegal file sharing. Where 
technically feasible, measures are to be taken in order to prevent such 
misuse as producers of applications and service providers may in 
certain cases be held liable for copyright infringements by their users.  
                                                          
67
 Notably in the case of the Belgian Society of Authors, Composers and Publishers against Internet service 
provider Scarlet, it was sought that Scarlet would be ordered to continuously and actively monitor its traffic in 
order to track piracy. After a number of national cases, a prejudicial question was transferred to the ECJ. Recently, 
the Advocate-General M. Pedro Cruz Villalón has concluded that a national measure requiring all Internet service 
providers to actively and continuously monitor all of their traffic would infract Community law. The Court’s final 
decision is currently pending. ECJ C‑70/10 Scarlet Extended SA v Société belge des auteurs compositeurs et 
éditeurs (Sabam), opinion of the Advocate-General of 14 April 2011.  
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5. Consolidation of Legal Requirements  
In the previous analyses, a number of specific legal requirements for the Smart Home and Smart 
Office scenario were developed. These requirements will be consolidated and completed here.  
 
A. BASIC DATA PROTECTION REQUIREMENTS 
Req. A1 
IoT actors identified as data controllers must be aware of the precise definitions of national 
data protection legislation applicable to the processing under their control. Collaboration with 
the competent national Data Protection Authority will ensure a correct understanding of the 
specific national implementation of the definitions of the applicable notions. 
Req. A2 
The data subject’s free, informed, specific and unambiguous consent must be obtained for 
legitimate processing of personal data. While such consent is only one of the possible 
justification grounds for legitimate personal data processing, it will in most cases be the only 
viable justification ground for personal data processing with relation to the IoT.  
 Further on consent, see Requirements D 
Req. A3 
Fair and lawful processing of personal data must demonstrate legality or transparency. 
Req. A4 
The purposes of the processing of personal data must be clearly indicated in advance. 
Req. A5 
The processing of personal data may only include relevant and non-excessive data, in relation to 
the specified purposes. Data must be collected for a specified, explicit and legitimate purpose 
and may not be further processed in a way incompatible with those purposes. 
Duration of data storage must be limited and stored data must be destructed once the purpose 
for which that data was collected has been attained.  
Req. A6 
Data minimization can also be achieved by employing methods for anonymization or 
pseudonymization of personal data. Here, data unlinkability should be kept in mind as linkability 
could lead to the identification of a particular data subject.  
Req. A7 
The data controller must ensure sufficient information of the data subject. 
Req. A8 
The data controller must ensure that the data subject can fully enforce his right of access, his 
right to correction and his right to object. 
Req. A9 
Special notice must be paid to the special categories of personal data, such as health data. 
These categories of personal data may only be processed on limited and strict justification 
grounds.  
 With regards to health data, see Req. E3 
Req. A10 
The data controller must ensure confidentiality and security of the processing of personal data 
under his control. 
 Further on confidentiality and security, see Requirements G 
Req. A11 
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Due notification must be made to the competent national Data Protection Authority (or 
Authorities), in compliance with national legislation. 
Req. A12 
Data transfers to third States must comply with applicable legislation. 
 
B. DATA PROTECTION AT HOME 
Req. B1 
Processing of personal data of family members of the same household must be executed in a 
personal capacity and strictly for purposes in the personal or household sphere, with restricted 
publicity of this data. Failure to observe personal capacity, personal or household purposes or 
to keep data publicity limited will result in the non-applicability of the household exception. As 
a result, the processing of this personal data must comply fully with all personal data processing 
requirements. 
Req. B2 
Also when no personal data is processed or when the household exception applies, any 
intrusion to the personal sphere of family members – including minor children – will be 
considered as a violation of their privacy. Prior consent must therefore be granted.  
 
C. DATA PROTECTION AT WORK 
Req. C1 
As in Req. A7, workers must be informed about the data their employer is collecting about 
them, directly or from other sources, for which processing purposes envisioned or performed 
with this data currently or in the future. Transparency must also be assured by granting the data 
subject the right to access to his or her personal data and with the data controllers’ obligation 
of notifying supervisory authorities as provided in national law. 
Req. C2 
As in Req. A3, the processing of workers' personal data must be legitimate. Article 7 of the Data 
Protection Directive lists the criteria making the processing legitimate. 
Req. C3 
As in Req. A5, the personal data must be adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to the 
purposes for which they are collected or further processed. Assuming that workers have been 
informed about the processing operation and assuming that such processing activity is 
legitimate and proportionate, such a processing still needs to be fair with the worker. 
Req. C4 
Employment records must be accurate and, where necessary, kept up to date. The employer 
must take every reasonable step to ensure that data inaccurate or incomplete, having regard to 
the purposes for which they were collected or further processed, are erased or rectified. 
Req. C5 
As in Req. A10, the employer must implement appropriate technical and organisational 
measures at the workplace to guarantee that the personal data of his workers is kept secured. 
Particular protection should be granted as regards unauthorised disclosure or access. 
Req. C6 
Staff in charge or with responsibilities in the processing of personal data of other workers need 
to know about data protection and receive proper training. Without an adequate training of the 
staff handling personal data, there could never be appropriate respect for the privacy of 
workers in the workplace. 
Req. C7 
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As in Req. A1, the precise capacity in which one party performs personal data processing on 
behalf of another party must be clearly established. Employees must be clearly identified as 
such in order to distinguish them from their employer/data controller and the external 
processor. 
Req. C8 
In order to determine their compliance with the means and purposes of a personal data 
processing, assistive technologies must clearly indicate whether, how and for what period of 
time logs containing personal data are stored, for what purpose, what data they contain 
precisely and by whom they can be accessed.  
 
D. CONSENT REQUIREMENTS 
Req. D1 
Carefully drafted privacy policies and consent forms – for instance in a multi-layered format – 
must ensure compliance to the requirement of consent and the right to information. Note that 
such privacy policies and consent forms must be compliant with national data protection 
legislation. For instance, certain jurisdictions require written consent, while others allow for 
implicit consent in many cases.   
Req. D2 
User-friendliness should be the focal point in obtaining the data subject’s consent. While 
unintelligible texts may lead to the data subject not reading a privacy policy or consent form, 
elaborate procedures to grant consent may result in the data subject refraining from using such 
service, thus damaging the business of the data controller. A balance between the interests of 
both parties should therefore be struck.   
Req. D3 
When dealing with minors, elderly and/or persons with a mental illness, the data controller is 
advised to seek consent from both the data subject and its statutory or legal guardians. The 
general legal capacity of the data subject determines its capacity to consent. 
Req. D4 
Informed consent must be given freely. In order to determine whether the data subject’s 
consent was given freely, one must analyze the external pressure exercised on his decision. 
Positive persuasion cannot invalidate his freely given consent, while negative coercion will 
invalidate his consent as it could not have been given freely. 
Req. D5 
Consent should be limited in time and should be renewed for continuously ongoing processing 
of personal data. Consent should also be revocable.  
 
E. HEALTH MONITORING 
Req. E1 
In using technologies that could potentially lead to a continuous collecting and processing of 
personal data, one must assess the proportionality of such collecting and processing. Mostly, 
the purpose for which the technology is used and for which the data is processed does not 
necessarily require continuous data processing. Therefore, one must select the least intrusive 
yet suitable means that lead to minimal data collection and storage. 
Req. E2 
As consent requires certain negotiability and as consent can be revoked, the health monitoring 
system must allow for certain adaptability of the system to the specific needs and wishes of the 
person under medical surveillance. This person must be offered the option to – temporary or 
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permanently – disable the features that he deems to intrusive, in line with expected 
amendments to the Data Protection Directive. 
Req. E3 
When health data is processed as part of the health monitoring system, the data controller 
must obtain the explicit – or written, where applicable – consent of the legally capable data 
subject as justification ground for the processing of this special category of personal data. In 
case of legal incapacity of the data subject, the processing of his health data can only be 
performed if necessity for the protection of his vital interests can be demonstrated. 
 
F. ELECTRONIC PAYMENT TRANSACTIONS 
Req. F1 
In electronic transactions, the service provider must inform the consumer about information 
relating to his name, geographic address of establishment, contact details, registration number, 
authorization where such is required for the activity performed, possible professional titles or 
institutional affiliation and VAT number. An electronic receipt of the order received must be 
issued to the consumer. 
Req. F2 
In electronic transactions, the service provider must provide information regarding the 
technical steps involved in concluding the electronic contract, whether or not that contract will 
be filed by the services provider and how it can be accessed, the technical means for identifying 
and correcting input errors prior to the placing of the order and the languages offered for the 
conclusion of the contract, including relevant codes of conduct, contract terms and general 
conditions. 
Req. F3 
The application allowing the use of the uTRUSTit device for NFC payments must explicitly state 
that it is a service provided by a technical service provider that is aimed at only supporting 
payment services, trust and privacy protection services and data and entity authentication. No 
funds to be transferred may be taken into possession at any time. 
Req. F4 
In order to establish the trustworthiness of electronic information relating to electronic 
payment transactions, the uTRUSTit mobile NFC payment application must guarantee the 
authenticity and the integrity of the information. The preferred method for providing 
authenticity and integrity is the use of audit trails, while in secondary order electronic 
signatures and EDI may be used.  
 
G. CONFIDENTIALITY AND SECURITY 
Req. G1 
In the processing of personal data, the data controller must restrict access to this personal data 
to the persons that need such access for the processing they perform under his authority. Such 
access need to comply with the proportionality principle, meaning that no user may be awarded 
access to more data than strictly required for his processing tasks. 
Req. G2 
In order to achieve proportional access control, the data controller must provide for 
differentiated access levels for different user groups in order to ensure proportionality. This 
must be combined with an access procedure that includes registration, identification, 
authentication and authorization. 
Req. G3 
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In the processing of personal data, the data controller must adopt appropriate and state of the 
art technical and organizational measures to ensure data security. Also the processor must be 
bound to such security policy. 
Req. G4 
Such security policy should include, inter alia, actions to be taken in case of data breach, the use 
of cryptography to protect data and audit trails to log and trace data access and use. These 
security policies should also take into account user-friendliness and should require minimal user 
effort. When using audit trails, the data controller must define the purposes and scope of this 
logging and make transparent who can access these logs as audit trails constitute personal data 
processing.  
Req. G5 
While previous requirements only apply in the context of the processing of personal data, 
adherence thereto in other cases of security and access management is strongly recommended 
as they provide valuable minimal requirements. 
 
H. TECHNOLOGY REQUIREMENTS 
Req. H1 
Regardless of the technology used, the data subject should be made fully aware of the presence 
of the technology and of its activities and of the possibility for deactivation.  
Req. H2 
A Privacy Impact Assessment should be used to assess privacy compliance of technologies and 
applications from their development phase on. Such should ensure ex ante compliance with 
privacy and data protection provisions.  
Req. H3 
Other privacy by design principles should be used as a guideline for embedding privacy 
compliance from the very start, thus avoiding later modifications aimed at achieving 
compliance. 
Req. H4 
As geolocation data must be viewed as personal data, the processing thereof must comply with 
the principles of the Data Protection Directive and its national implementations. 
Req. H5 
Prior informed consent must be obtained for the processing of geolocation data, as this will 
mostly be the only viable justification ground for the processing of this data. This consent must 
be revocable and must be regularly renewed. 
Req. H6 
Geolocation services should be switched off by default. The user should be made aware of 
active geolocation services. The user should also be given the option to choose the granularity 
of his consent. The user should also be given the option to opt-out from databases containing 




Producers of the Trusted Smart Home Entertainment Management applications should assess 
whether their applications can be misused by users for illegal file sharing. Where technically 
feasible, measures should be taken in order to prevent such misuse as producers of applications 
and service providers may in certain cases be held liable for copyright infringements by their 
users. 
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6. Summary 
In this deliverable the general legal requirements derived from the general privacy framework 
that devices should comply with as a prerequisite for trust and the general liability framework – as 
conceived under Deliverable 7.1-Legal Requirements for Trust in the IoT – were applied to the Office 
and Home Scenario developed under Deliverable 2.2-Definition of User Scenarios, as well as to the 
Personas developed under Deliverable 2.1-Personas.  
 
In order to ensure legal compliance by the prototype to be designed within the uTRUSTit project, 
the Scenarios and Personas were analyzed to identify a number of key legal issues that needed further 
assessment. First, the general data protection requirements were completed focusing on the needs for 
privacy and data protection at home and at work. Second, the issue of informed consent was analyzed 
with regards to the effectiveness of consent and the capacity to consent. Third, the health monitoring 
system was analyzed, resulting in legal requirements regarding the adaptability of the system and the 
processing of health data by such system. Fourth, the use of electronic payments was analyzed from the 
perspective of electronic payment transactions and the trustworthiness of electronic information. Fifth, 
security and access management aspects were found to need specific confidentiality and security 
requirements. Sixth, the use of the technologies of the IoT was analyzed from the point of view of 
general privacy concerns and the rising use of geolocation applications. Last, the possibility of copyright 
infringements by the media sharing system was analyzed, also focusing on the potential liability of the 
producers of such system for copyright infringements by its users.  
 
The research conducted here has resulted in a more concrete list of requirements, reiterating 
and complementing the general legal requirements formulated under Deliverable 7.1-Legal 
Requirements for Trust in the IoT. These new requirements can serve as a means to ensure full legal 
compliance by the uTRUSTit prototype up from its earliest design and development stages.  
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